The growth of regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa by Mshigeni, Deogratius Stephen
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations 
1-1-2002 
The growth of regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Deogratius Stephen Mshigeni 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds 
Repository Citation 
Mshigeni, Deogratius Stephen, "The growth of regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa" (2002). UNLV 
Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 1460. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/p31m-5bzf 
This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu. 
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMi films 
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing 
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
ProQuest Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
800-521-0600
UMI*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE G RO W TH OF R EG IO N AU SM  IN  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
by
Deogratius Stephen Mshigeni
Bachelor o f Arts 
University o f Dar es S ala am , Tanzania 
1998
Master o f Arts 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas 
2002
A  thesis submitted in  partial f u lfillm e n t  o f the 
requirements fo r the
Master of Alts Degree in Political Science 
Department of Political Science 
College of Liberal Arts
Graduate College 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
December 2002
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number. 1413613
UMI
UMI Microform 1413613 
Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Copyright by Deogratius Stephen Mshigeni 2002 
A ll Rights Reserved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ITNTV Thesis ApprovalT he G ra d u a te  C o llege 
U n iv ers ity  o f  N e v a d a , Las Vegas
OCTOBER 7 20 02
T he T hesis p re p a re d  b y  
DEOGRATIUS STEPHEN MSHIGENI
Entitled
THE GROWTH OF REGIONALISM IN  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
is a p p ro v e d  in  p a r tia l fu lfillm e n t o f  th e  req u irem en ts  for the  d e g re e  o f
MASTER OF ARTS
E:^mination Committee Member 
Examination Committee Member
Graduate College Faculty Representative
îL_z.
Examination Committee^Cliair
)ean o f the Graduate College
loirôü II
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
The Growth of Regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa
by
Deogratius Stephen Mshigeni
D r. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Political Science 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
The emerging world is very different from  the world o f the mid-twentieth century. 
The East-West conflict and North-South dualism no longer provide an adequate framework 
fo r understanding global political trends. The fa ll o f communism has forced countries to 
reposition themselves in  light o f increasing transnational interdependence, both in terms o f 
benefiting from  the opportunities offered and o f containing the risks involved. Hence, Sub 
Saharan African countries have been moving in the same direction fo r a number o f years 
now.
In  this thesis I w ill explain how Sub-Saharan Africa has struggled through 
globalization and interdependence. I  w ill discuss the major theories, which have evolved in 
the integration literature since the 1960’s after the independence o f these form er colonies. In  
addition, I w ill show how scholars in  the field o f international relations and cooperation have 
attempted to define and redefine “ Integration” and resolved conceptual confusion facing 
students and scholars in this field. Furthermore, I  w ill show why the applicability o f 
“ traditional”  integration theories, which have worked well in  such regions as Europe, and 
applied in Sub-Saharan Africa, failed to produce the same satisfactory results. Also, I  w ill
iii
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discuss the ideas o f some integration theorists from  Sub-Saharan Africa, who came with 
their own frameworks fo r the integration to work in the region. I  w ill explain the 
applicability o f other frameworks such as dependency theories and developmentalism, which 
have been used to explain Third world conditions, Sub-Saharan Africa in  particular. Further, 
I  w ill explain why integration among developing countries depends on the effects of 
successful creation o f regional markets (whether they are bilateral o r multilateral) and the 
prospective gains from  trade liberalization. However, while these goals are important, the 
structural features o f typical developing countries, such as immobilized resources, capital 
formation fo r domestic investment and poor infrastructures and communications often 
present enormous obstacles toward their realization, and Sub-Saharan Africa is no exception.
I  w ill look at various Integration schemes in the region and show how far they have 
succeeded in building an environment to enhance cooperation w ithin the sub-regions. In  
conclusion, I  w ill make a general evaluation o f these schemes and various aspects o f regional 
cooperation such as trade creation and trade divergence, if  they help to increase or decrease 
cooperation. Also, I  w ill evaluate issues such as successful creation o f free trade areas, usage 
o f single ta riff rate, continental parliament and creation o f continental court o f justice can 
help in  establishing a successful African unity (The United States o f Africa), while the 
continental leadership remains the same. Further, I w ill look at Neo-functionalist theory vis a 
vis integral federalism, as an alternative path fo r African union, than the traditional 
integration theories.
IV
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CHAPTER I 
IN TR O D U C TIO N
Regionalism is said to bring about economic development, however this is not true 
fo r the African continent, especially sub-Saharan Africa which is the most marginalized and 
in that, it could be said to have devised the concept o f the ‘failed state’. In  the era of 
regionalization, Sub-Saharan Africa has lost its share o f world trade, w ith this counting fo r 
less than 2 per cent by 1997. Africa has been dependent on the im portation o f primary 
products, therefore always vulnerable to price fluctuations and declining revenues. 
Furthermore, in the midst o f globalization in 1990 andl993, Africa’s real commodity prices 
fell by more than a half in  the world market and thus hurting the continent more. W ithin the 
whole regionalism advocacy the continent is still lagging behind and is home o f the most 
underdeveloped, poorest nations in the world. Hence, regionalism is seen as a stepping-stone 
towards economic and political development.
This thesis w ill explore some important features and efforts towards regionalism 
seen in  sub-Saharan Africa. Although sub-Saharan Africa shows some signs o f regional 
integration, it still exceedingly emulates the European Union functionalism and a neo- 
functionalist theory towards integration, which does not fit Africa as well as it, does in 
Europe.
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Conceptual D efin ition
One o f the prom inent features o f the contemporary international system is the 
he%htened tendency o f some states to come together towards some degree o f regional 
arrangements o r cooperation. This can either be economic o r political integration; the 
process toward integration was o f relatively little  importance before 1945, but it gained 
popularity after W orld W ar H. Although there were unsuccessful attempts in  the inter-war 
period to establish some kind o f custom union in  Europe, the issue o f integration did not 
come to the forefront un til after W W II, when it became very clear that the relatively small 
states created in Western Europe during the past centuries no longer corresponded with the 
size requirements o f a modem industrial economy.' In  addition, states cannot survive in 
isolation in  today’s contemporary world. States depend on each other fo r a continuous 
coordination o f the economy, the need fo r production and consumption naturally leads to 
the necessity o f access to markets outside their particular boundaries, which in turn 
motivates various countries to interact. Therefore, interdependence can be defined simply as 
an environment where states mutually cooperate w ith each other.
Many scholars have attempted to define "Integration". However, the main problem, 
facing students and scholars o f political science and international relations, is conceptual 
confusion. There is no consensus among scholars about the meanings o f various "terms" 
and their usage in  political science in general. Furthermore, the common usage o f the term 
“ Integration” is often confusing, and different integration theorists have referred to the term 
differendy, though they almost arrived at the same conclusions. Even the dicdonary
definition o f integration: “ Forming parts into whole ” leaves a wide range o f ambiguity.
There is s till no single defin ition o f integration that has gained widespread acceptance among
‘ Asante, S.K.B, " The Political Economy o f Regionalism in Africa: A decade o f  the Economic Community 
o f  W est African States (ECOW AS)" 1986, pg. 19.
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regional integration scholars.’ The integration concept, therefore, has provoked considerable 
discussion and debate in economic and political literature. However, in  a simple form, 
integration refers to the process by which supranational institutions come to replace national 
ones, the gradual shifting upward o f sovereignty from  the state to regional or global 
structures. The ultimate expression o f integration would be the merger o f several (or many^ 
countries into a single country or ultimately a single government. Such a shift o f sovereignty 
to the supranational level would likely entail some version o f federalism, in  which states (or 
other political units) would recognize the sovereignty o f a central government while retaining 
certain powers fo r themselves. Nevertheless, over a period o f time integration came to be 
used more specifically as a term denoting a state o f affairs o r a process involving the 
combination o f separate economies into larger economic regions.^ When integration is 
defined as a process it  includes all measures that aim at abolishing differences between 
economic units from  different countries. I t  can also be considered as a state o f affairs 
characterized by the absence o f various forms o f distinctions o r differences between 
countries. This definition seems to be very closely related to what John Pinder referred to as 
a European Economic Community (EEQ , a tw in process involving both negative and 
positive aspects o f integration. The negative integration is that aspect o f economic 
integration that includes the elimination o f distinctions against participating members. 
Positive integration symbolizes the formation and application o f coordinated and common
■ Dougherty, J and Pfaitzgraff Jr., R.L. "Contending theories o f  International relations: A Comprehensive 
Survey" 4"" ed. 1997, pg.420
Also, see. Viotti, P.R and Kauppi, M.V, "International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism" 
1987, pg. 364
 ̂Asante, S.K.B, The Political Economv o f  Regionalism  in Africa: A decade o f  the Economic Community 
o f  W est African States 1986, pg. 07.
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policies in  order to fu lfill economic and welfare objectives other than the mere removal o f 
discrim ination/
Furthermore, the literature has been fu ll o f two competing terms, "Regional 
integration" and "Regional cooperation", which have been used interchangeably. I t  may be 
useful to differentiate between the two. While, as noted above, the term regional integration 
has acquired several quite technical definitions, regional cooperation is a vague concept, 
applicable to any interstate activity w ith less than universal participation designed to meet 
some commonly experienced needs. However, various scholars have worked hard to 
differentiate between the two competing terms. A  scholar such as Emst Haas, who was a 
central figure in  neo-functionalism, has attempted to lim it the semantic confusion arising 
from  the terms "Integration" and "Cooperation". Basing his early work on an analysis o f 
Europe, Haas has argued that the study o f regional integration is not the same as the study 
o f regional cooperation. ’ According to Haas, regional integration is concerned with 
explanations o f “ how and why states cease to be w holly sovereign, how and why they 
voluntarily mingle, merge and mix w ith their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes o f 
sovereignty while acquiring new techniques fo r resolving conflict between themselves. 
“ Regional cooperation,”  on the other hand, is concerned w ith the process o f “ getting there” . 
In  other words, it  means regional cooperation may help o r lead to steps towards regional 
integration. Therefore, in  this respect, the term integration may be treated as a terminal or 
resulting condition, the End State, or outcome or consequence o f regional cooperation 
activities. Hence, the study o f regional cooperation may be considered as a part o f the study 
o f regional integration o r as a separate interest. However, the main point to emphasize here
*  For a detailed discussion on this see Dougherty and Pfaitzgraff, Contending Theories o f  International 
Relations: A Com prehensive Survey 4“* ed. 1997, pg. 422
* ibid. Pg.423
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is that, states w ill eventually come to share individual authority w ith a collective mechanism 
or entity. For example, today one hears calls fo r a “ United States o f Europe”  o r “ United 
States o f Africa” o r even o f the World, but in practice the process o f integration has never 
gone beyond a partial and uneasy sharing o f power between the state and supranational 
levels. States have been unwilling to give up their exclusive c la im  to sovereignty and have 
severely lim ited the power and authority o f supranational institutions. Therefore, States tend 
to share and delegate few powers to the supranational institutions which have been formed. 
Although many scholars have treated regional integration as a “ process” or as a “ condition” 
fo r the purpose o f this discourse, I have regarded regional integration both ways as a 
“ process” and also as a “ condition” . In  other words, all the actors (nation-states or 
international organizations) who joined forces with the intention to pursue the same goal in 
vanous fields whether economically or politically may lead to a partial o r complete 
integration o f the region. Most o f the scholars and theorists on integration have treated the 
field as a multidimensional phenomenon that encompasses the political, societal, cultural and 
economic spheres, leading to a sense o f common identity and integrated community,^ which 
is a right way to  put it fo r the sake o f this thesis.
Finally, as a theory o f cooperation, “ integration”  seems to lack both a commonly 
accepted basic definition and a series o f agreed indicators as a basis fo r measurement. 
Integration theorists have disagreed on a number o f irrçortant aspects such as supranational 
elites, international structures, intergovernmental actions and domestic political factors, 
which happens to be important aspects to the process o f integration. James Dougherty 
agrees that in the absence o f a basic definition and conceptual consensus, it  is hardly 
surprising to find discord about the indicators that could measure integration. Dougherty
6 :u;ibid. pg. 422
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and Pfaitzgraff Jr. in  Contending Theories o f International Relations (1997) gave an exançle 
from  the European Union. They asked such questions as; is the European Union w ithin the 
integration processes leading to community? A t wkat point, and in  what sequence, do the 
various phenomena associated w ith integration assert themselves to produce acceleration, or 
slowing o f the integrative momentum? How important is the supranational institutionalism, 
contrasted w ith intergovernmental institutionalism in the prom otion o f integration? These 
questions are very important in  the study o f contemporary regional integration and w ill be 
answered in this thesis. Therefore, the lack o f a commonly accepted defin ition and a series 
o f indicators as a basis fo r a measurement in integration theories has led scholars to reach 
different conclusions about the status of, and prospects for, integration in different areas o f 
their studies.
Integration Theories
There have been a number o f theoretical explanations regarding regional integration. 
Various scholars have tried to give analytical explanations about the tendency o f nations or 
other intemational actors to merge. The integration theories formulated during the I950's 
and 1960’s did not provide complete answers to the theorists' main questions: w ith in what 
environment, under what conditions, and by what processes does a new transnational 
political unit peacefully emerge from  two or more in itia lly separate and different ones? I 
th ink the theories had to be incomplete because the cases available at that time; the Western 
European Common Market, Latin American and African customs unions and various other 
regional ventures were, in their infancy. Therefore, little  could be learned about the 
processes leading to an end state because no end states had been attained.
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I t  was supposed that integration would ultimately produce something like a tution- 
state o r multinational federation, but empirically there was no way to tell. H istory could be 
checked fo r more cases, and it  was to a certain extent, but this le ft other unanswerable 
questions about the comparability o f conditions across eras.  ̂ Scholars such as Hans 
Morgenthau (realism/realpolitik). Da\nd Mitrany (functionalism) and Emst Haas and Karl 
Deutsch (Neo-functionalism) established most o f the major intellectual theoretical work on 
international relations and integration.
Realism/Realpo litik
As a distinct approach to intemational relations Modem Realism grew out o f a 
reaction to idealism in the interwar period. It has contributed extensively to the answers o f 
why nations have a tendency to merge or cooperate in various spheres. Its roots however go 
back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau.* However, the father o f the realist 
school and one o f the most influential analysts in  intemational relations, Hans Morgenthau, 
best explained the Realist tradition. Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations (1978) was an 
immensely important study that influenced successive generations o f scholars and analysts. 
The realpolitik by Morgenthau is founded on the assumption that individuals are a bunch o f 
selfish, power minded sinners. Therefore, the solution is to build a strong, powerful state, 
which you create a condition o f stability, where you w ill not be attacked. Many times his 
ideas on how to conduct foreign policy have had an impact on decision-makers. 
Morgenthau’s proposition in intemational politics was that politics is a struggle fo r power;
’See a detailed analysis o f  this in Donald J. Puchala, " The Integration Theorists and the study o f  
International relations,” in the Classic readings o f  Intem ational relations 1994, pg. 261
* Editors-W illiam, P., Goldstein, D.M and Shafritz, J.M on "Theories and Traditions" in “Classic Readings 
o f  International relations" 1994, pg. 09
For further discussion see also, Viotti and Kauppi, " Intemational relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism" 1987, pg. 32-43.
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hence, states define their national interest in  terms o f pow er/ Morgenthau's book. Politics 
among Nations (1978) suffered criticisms. The critics argue that Morgenthau relied too 
heavily fo r his starting argument on a concept o f human nature that was very elusive. His 
core concepts such as power and interest are vague and ill defined, and that it was not clear 
whether he had developed a prescriptive or a descriptive theory. Although many 
subsequent analysts, such as Robert Keohane and Kenneth Waltz, rejected many parts o f 
Moigenthau's analysis, his idea o f intemational politics being a struggle fo r power later 
became a basis fo r much theorizing." Robert Keohane, one o f the first analysts to write 
about the growing trend toward interdependence and cooperation among states and criticize 
Hans Morgenthau, has pointed out that even many o f those who followed in  the tradition o f 
power politics did not share all o f Morgenthau's assumptions. Perhaps the most important 
difference was that subsequent theorists focused less on the anarchical nature o f the 
intemational system as one o f the basic determinants o f intemational political behavior. 
Another im portant Realist theorist is Kenneth Waltz (a neo-realist), who placed 
unprecedented emphasis on the structure o f the system, a term  he used to explain both 
anarchy (in the sense that central overriding authority was absent) and the distribution o f 
power or capabilities w ith in the system. The cmcial difference between Waltz and 
Morgenthau here is that, the latter sees states as lusting fo r power, while the former sees 
states as searching fo r security. States, in Morgenthau's world, are driven by ambition, while 
those in Waltz's environment are motivated by fear about the possible ambitions o f others."
’ Viotti and Kauppi, "Intemational relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism" 1987, pg. 60-66 
Keohane, R., ed. "Neo realism and its critics" 1986, pg. 20-40 
"  ibid. pg.20-40 also see Waltz, K.N., ed. “Theory o f  tatem ational Politics" 1979.
"  Editors-W illiam, P., Goldstein, D.M and Shafritz, J.M., "Classic Readings o f  Intem ational Relations" 
1994, pg. I I
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Therefore, Waltz sees force and threat as the only things, which drive nations to seek 
cooperation o r merge w ith others fo r the sake o f security.
Functionalism
Writers on integration have several features in common. Most o f them are concerned 
w ith the process by which loyalty o r attention is shifted from  one center to another. They 
share an interest in  patterns o f communications and transactions w ith in  units to be 
integrated. In  general, integration theorists hold that persons adopt integrative behavior 
because o f expectations o f jo in t rewards fo r doing so or penalties fo r fa iling to do so. 
Functionalism can be defined as a theory about the growth o f specialized technical 
organizations that cross national boarders. According to Functionalists, technological and 
economic development lead to more supranational structures as states seek practical means 
to fu lfill necessary functions such as delivering mail, phone calls from  one country to 
another o r coordinating the use o f rivers that cross borders. Some intemational relations 
scholars tried to measure the extent o f functional connections in  Europe, fo r instance, by 
counting the flow  o f mail and other communications among various countries. As these 
connections became denser and flowed faster, functionalism predicted that states would be 
drawn together into stronger intemational economic superstructures. In  this respect, 
functionalism provides the essential basis fo r an understanding o f much o f the twentieth- 
century integration and cooperation theory. The work o f scholars such as David M itrany in 
this field has greatly influenced subsequent efforts to develop integration theory."
In  his main theoretical contribution, A  W orking Peace System published in 1943, 
M itran/s main assumption was that the world o f the twentieth-century was characterized by
"  Dougherty and Pfaitzgraff Jr., "Contending theories o f  Intem ational relations" 4*  ed. 1997, pg. 422
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
growing numbers o f technical issues, which could be resolved only by cooperation across 
boundaries. Whether w ith in o r among states, cooperation could be well addressed by highly 
specialized trained personnel o r technicians rather than politicians. The emergence o f 
technical issues would lead first to the need fo r collaborative action, w ithout political 
considerations. "  According to M itrany, such pressing problems could be best addressed 
outside the politicized context o f ideology or nationalism. The main suggestion, which 
M itrany gave, was the creation o f a th ic k e n in g  web o f stmctures and procedures in  the 
formation o f institutions that would help emphasize cooperation in  order to find solutions 
to a specific need o r function. Furthermore, David M itrany laid a foundation fo r what he 
came to call ram ification theory. Successful cooperation in  one functional setting would 
enhance the incentive fo r cooperation or collaboration in another field. In  this sense, the 
process by which such cooperation came about as a result o f calculated need in one 
functional task would in itself contribute to a change in a range o f issues." Basically, 
ramification theory assumes that when two o r more countries decide to integrate in  technical 
areas, sooner or later they slowly find  other common areas to integrate. A  very good 
example here is the European Union, which started as the European Coal and Steel 
Community. This kind o f a process w ill also reduce the prospects for, and eventually 
eliminate, conflicts by a transformation in behavioral patterns from  conflictual to 
cooperative. Functional cooperation would prompt necessary intemational institutions in the 
form  o f organizations and regimes based on multilateralism according to the term inology 
many o f M itran /s intellectual successors."
'•* ibid.
"  For a detailed discussion see, M itrany, D., article "The Functionalist Alternative" in the "Classic readings 
o f  International Relations" 1994, pg. 257-59
"  Dougherty and Pfaitzgraff Jr., "Contending Theories o f  International Relations" 4* ed. 1997, pg. 422
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Neo-Functionalism
Neo-functionalism is a modification o f the functionalist theory by intemational 
relations scholars to explain the development o f more general, more political supranational 
bodies. Neo-functionalists argue that economic integration (functionalism) generates a 
political dynamic that drives integration further. Qoser economic ties need more political 
coordination between the states to operate effectively and eventually lead to political 
integration as well as a process called 'spillover', whereby States find other spheres to 
cooperate after a successful cooperation in  one sphere. Neo-functionalist w riting includes 
works by Karl Deutsch, Em st Flaas, Philipe Schmitter, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye, Robert 
Keohane and Lawrence Scheineman, all o f whom tried in one way o r another to  m odify the 
work done by M itrany on functionalism. The basic argument o f all o f the above theorists is 
that actors usually integrate because o f the sense o f commonality. The common values, 
norms, cultural bacl^round, economy and other environmental issues can lead to strong 
integration o r cooperation between two o r more countries. Among the neo-functionalist 
theorists who have done remarkable work in  the analysis o f the neo-functionalist theory to 
integration, selected works by Em st Haas, K arl Deutsch and Joseph Nye have been chosen 
fo r the purpose o f this discussion. These three scholars have been selected because o f their 
contribution to contemporary regionalism literature.
As contemporaries, Em st Haas, K arl Deutsch and Joseph Nye exchanged relatively 
few insights concerning intemational integration because their focus o f analytical attention 
and conceptual vocabularies were very d iffe rent." Karl Deutsch paid little  attention to the 
role o f intemational institutions during pohncal unification, while Haas emphasized political 
unification and Joseph Nye the modification o f neo-functionalism as a theory. Moreover,
"  Puchala, D.J "The Integration Theorists and The Study o f  Intemational Relations" article 37 in the book 
"Classic readings o f  Intem ational relations" 1994, pg. 265
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
Deutsch's concepts and analytical vocabulary came largely from  communication theory and 
his earlier work on nationalism. Phas and Nye drew some o f their concepts from  M itrany s 
functionalism and created their own, using a kind o f vocabulary tailored to the ir specific 
purposes. '* Deutsch and Haas differed rather fundamentally on a principal o f causal 
relationship in the political unification process. As noted, Deutsch saw the mutual 
identification o f peoples or “ community’’ preceding and creating favorable conditions fo r 
instim tional amalgamation. But Haas' work by contrast suggested that institutional 
amalgamation precedes and leads to community because effective institutionalization at the 
intemational level invites a refocusing o f people's political attentions and a shifting o f their 
loyalties. According to Haas, community among people follows s o m e tim e  after political and 
cultural sh ift have occurred."
In  his work, The Uniting o f Europe (1958), Haas examined the European Coal and 
Steel Gommumty after W orld War II. He argued that, the decision to proceed with 
integration, o r to oppose it, depended on the expectations o f gain or loss held by major 
groups w ith in the umt to be 'integrated,' rather than relying upon a scheme o f integration 
which brings some 'altruistic' motives as the conditions o f conduct. In  this way, it seems to 
be more reasonable to focus on the interests and values defended by major groups within 
the unit to be ‘integrated’ rather than such a complex and confusing notion, as “ the desire 
fo r Franco-German peace” or the “ w ill to a united Europe” .“  In  this case, Haas’ assumption 
was that integration proceeds as a result o f the work o f relevant elites in  the government and 
private sectors who support integration fo r essentially pragmatic reasons such as the 
expectation that the removal o f trade barriers w ill increase markets and profits. Later on, he
'* ibid.
"  For in depth analysis see, Haas, E "The Challenge o f  Regionalism, In Contem porary Theory o f  
International relations" 1960, pg. 223-240 
Dougherty and Pfaitzgraff Jr., "Contending Theories o f  International relations" 4'*' ed. 1997, pg. 423-24
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
introduced the concept o f 'spillover', which closely followed Mitrany’s “ Ramification 
theory’’ . In  his studies o f the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ, he found that 
there was a tendency fo r persons who experienced gains from  supranational institutions in  
one sector to also favor integration in other sectors. Therefore, spillover is a process 
whereby nations upgrade the ir national interests in a larger integrative setting."' Through 
spillover effects members approach integration w ith the experiences they had w ith form er 
arrangements, present problems or future threats. For example, it  can be economic threat, 
cultural threat o r even security issues.
Karl Deutsch approached integration from  a different perspective. Deutsch 
developed the theory o f cybernetics, whereby integration is supposed to be distinguished 
from  ama%amation. According to Deutsch, integration has to do w ith the formation o f 
communities, and amalgamation deals w ith the establishment o f organizations, associations, 
o r political institutions. Communities are groups o f people who have attributes w ith 
common goals, who display mutual responsiveness, confidence, and esteem and who 
consciously self identify.”  However, a minimum condition o f community according Deutsch 
is a shared expectation among members that their conflicts w ill be peacefully resolved in a 
new security community. Nevertheless, Deutsch’s assumption o f intemational communities 
may be either amalgamated o r pluralistic. I f  amalgamated, the community would look very 
much like a federation or nation-state, w ith institutions o f central government regulating the 
internal and external relations o f an integrated population. In  his book. Political Communitv 
and the N orth Atlantic Area: Intemational Organization in the l  ight o f Historical 
Experience (1957), he noted that a fu lly  amalgamated community would in  fact be
"  ibid.
“  Puchala, D .J "The Integration Theorists and the study o f  Intem ational relations" article 37 in the book 
"Classic readings o f  Intem ational Relations" 1997, pg. 261
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
indistinguishable from  a federation or nation-state. As an integration theory, in  the sense the 
term is being used here, Deutsch's formulation is valuable in  that it focuses on the 
intemational com m unity formation during unification. Other theorists have largely ignored 
this dimension. K a rl Deutsch's formulations allow fo r a number o f possible end products, as 
noted, but to the extent that intemational political unification is under exploration, the 
assumed end product looks like a nation-state, and attaining this implies that both 
integration and amalgamation have occurred, most like ly in sequence.
Finally, Joseph Nye a neo-functionalist closely followed the footsteps o f other great 
functionalists including Haas and Mitrany. Nye developed his model based m ainly on the 
aspects o f 'process o f mechanism' and what he called 'integrative potential'. He set forth  a 
theoretical framework fo r analyzing the conditions fo r integration, drawn specifically from  
European examples as well as other non-westem experiences that gready changed the 
notions o f politicization and spillover found in the writings o f his predecessors." According 
to Nye, the neo-functionalist literature has seven distinguishable “ process mechanisms” . The 
seven "process mechanisms" concepts are very important in  the integration literature even 
though they had some weakness from  the previous theorists.
However, what he did was to redefine and reformulate neo-functionalist theory from  
the “ process mechanism”  concepts. The seven "process mechanism" are:
1. Functionalist linkage o f task, or the concept o f spillover
2. Rising transactions
3. Deliberate linkages and coalition formation
4. Elite socialization 5. Regional group formation 6. Ideological-Identitive appeal and 
7. Involvement o f external actors in the process.
' Dougherty and P faitzgraff Jr., "Contending Theories o f  Intem ational Relations" 4'*' ed. 1997 pg. 426-30
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Central to his neo-functionalist model is what Nye termed 'integrative potential’, that is the 
integrative conditions stimulated by the process mechanism. Here he presented four basic 
conditions that are said to  influence both the nature o f the original commitment and the 
subsequent evolution o f an integrative scheme. Nye's four conditions are:
1. Symmetry o r economic equality o f units
2. Elite value complementarity
3. Existence o f pluralism and
4. Capacity o f member states to adopt and respond
According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr., the neo-functionalist model, such as that 
developed by Nye, provides a framework fo r comparing integrative processes in more 
developed and less developed regions o f the world and assessing the extent to which micro- 
regional o r functionally specific economic organizations hold potential fo r further 
development toward federations.
Applicability o f Integration Theories to Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Third W orld in general, have the most cases o f regional 
integration arrangements. Central to the literature on integration is the problem relating to 
the theoretical foundations on which the recent drive towards regional integration has been 
based. The problem facing scholars on integration is that research in  the field is dominated 
by theory based on European experience. This makes its applicability to the Third W orld 
countries d ifficu lt, because o f the difference in nature o f social and economical conditions 
between Europe and the Third world.
In  The Political Economy o f Regionalism in Africa (1986), Asante stated the 
European Economic Community (EEC/ED) is a living laboratory fo r integration theories.
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He was not surprised that the literature on integration and development pointed out that 
developing nations do not satisfy the criteria o f a neo-classical customs union theory nor w ill 
they reap the traditional welfare gains from  integration. He gave examples o f economists 
such as Jacob V iner and R.G. Lipsey who denied that integration schemes would benefit 
developing countries. Their general argument has been based upon the concepts o f trade 
creation and trade diversion.’'*
By definition, trade creation means a shift in  trade from  high cost to low  cost sources 
o f supply w ithin the integration area, and trade diversion means a shift from  low  cost source 
o f supply outside the integration area to a high cost producer within it. In  Asante's view, if  
there is more trade diversion than trade creation w ithin a custom union the net effect on the 
world welfare and the welfare o f the members w ill be negative. Since trade diversion (at least 
in the short run) w ill obviously prevail over trade creation in the Third W orld customs union 
as the members sh ift from  low  cost producers in the developed W orld to high cost 
producers among themselves in the integration, it won't benefit the member states. Thus 
Jacob Viner and K G  Lipsey concluded that there is no benefit from  creation o f customs 
union among developing countries. In  this regard Sub-Saharan Africa is not an exception.^ 
Ffowever, recently there have been a growing number o f criticisms on the application of 
Viner's criteria and Lipsey's general conclusions about the possible effects o f customs union 
among developing countries.’  ̂ Many scholars dealing w ith integration among developing 
countries have rejected the neo-classical custom union theory and have argued that the 
problems o f integration among peripheral countries should be analyzed w ith in the context o f 
development economies rather than as a branch o f ta riff theory. The Neo-classical customs
’■* Asante, S.K.B " The Political Economy o f  Regionalism in Africa: A Decade o f  the Economic
Community O f W est A frican States (ECOW AS)" 1986, pg. 10-15 
ibid.
Melo, J.D and Panagariya, A., "New Dimensions in Regional Integration" 1993, pg. 234
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union allows the establishment o f a common ta riff policy towards non-member countries, 
which is not very beneficial to the economies o f Third W orld countries and it  is d ifficu lt fo r 
these countries to reap the traditional welfare gains from  integration.
The argument above is m a in ly  based on the fact that conditions in the developir^ 
countries are strikingly different from  those that exist in  the developed world upon which 
the established theoretical framework fo r integration has been based. The critical factors on 
which Viner's criteria and Lipsey's conclusions were based are among the ones developing 
nations such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa are struggling to change through the application 
o f integration. Recently, the Sub-Saharan African countries have been involved in  an effort 
to alter the structures o f their economies and integrate their foreign trade more closely than 
before. In  other words, these countries aim at changing the structure o f production and 
trade, and then at evolving new trade mechanisms based on regional specialization. The 
actual results w ill not be fe lt over a short period. This is because the creation o f a custom 
union or a free trade area usually involves a relatively long period o f time fo r results to 
appear. In  as much, the in itia l influence, and perhaps the most in ço rtan t aspect, is the 
expectation o f future market opportunities rather than existing trade patterns. Thus, 
attention is supposed to be focused on the long run effects integration is like ly to have. 
Thus, many scholars who have written on the Sub-Saharan Africa integration experience 
have suggested that in  evaluating the desirability o f integration in the region, the emphasis 
should be placed on the dynamics rather than static effects. More specifically, we should be 
concerned w ith the creation o f regional markets according to the developmental pace o f 
member countries. B rie fly  then, integration in the case o f developing countries should be 
treated as an approach to econom ic/political development rather than only a ta riff issue. 
Accordingly, it  combines various aspects that could improve the international trade position
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as well as raise the level o f economic development o f Sub-Saharan Africa.
Regional integration in most developing areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa is in many 
respects a very different phenomenon than in an economically advanced area such as 
Western Europe o r N orth  America, hfowever, there are some features v iiic h  are more or 
less the same and others that are to ta lly different. First, fo r instance, one may point out 
important differences in infrastructure, market mechanisms and external dependence on 
administrative resources, political group structure and interdependence o f social sectors, 
national consciousness and ideology. Am itai Etzioni, (a famous integration scholar), has 
argued that lim ited horizons, lack o f administrative and political skills, and preoccupation 
w ith problems o f domestic modernization all present a major barrier to successful 
integration efforts in  the developing world, and in this case Sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular.^
Second, Western European countries could afford to treat integration as a 'matter o f 
welfare politics' w ithout foreclosing the ir 'high politics option' because each started from  a 
relatively industrialized base. The base is quite different in developing Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As Joseph Nye has pointed out, integration involving developing countries seems to produce 
not 'gradual politicization' but 'over politicization’, a premature politicization o f integration 
may be because some economic issues greatly reduce the scope fo r bureaucratic initiatives 
and quietly arrange the packaged deals. Thus, conditions that may be deemed necessary fo r 
successful integration in  the developed areas cannot reasonably be applied to the developing 
areas. The same criteria fo r judging the success or failure o f an integrative process cannot be 
applied to efforts in both the developed and developing areas. Furthermore, to some extent 
the integrative process itself is different in developed and developing countries. More
Etzioni, A., "Political Unification: A Com parative Studies" 1964, pg. 318-21
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significandy, the objectives o f integration in developing areas are different than those in 
developed areas. In  developed countries the overall o r general objective o f integration is to 
maintain and enhance an already existing growth, whether it  is economic o r political. Hence 
the principal economic goal is to assist the development o f already established industries and 
other institutions through trade expansion, increased c o n ^ titio n , and creation o f a peaceful 
political environment fo r further growth o f the region involved.
In  the case o f Third W orld countries, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the goal o f 
integration needs to be redefined. Here, the ultimate purpose o f integration is to achieve an 
acceleration o f economic growth w ith in the partner countries. However, given the limited 
amount o f scarce resources and technical know how w ith in these countries, they search to 
benefit their economies by complementing one another w ith in their arrangements. N o t only 
do they try  to accelerate the growth o f their economies, but they also try  to m a in ra in  the 
same rate o f growth and lower the cost associated w ith the use o f scarce resources. In  other 
words, integration in the Third world countries is seen as a primary means o f contributing to 
economic growth and development. Therefore, the results or impact o f integration in 
developing areas should be evaluated in  terms o f its contribution to development and not 
necessarily to greater efficiency.
In  conclusion, it is d ifficu lt fo r Sub-Saharan Africa to fo llow  the same path toward 
integration as developed countries have taken. The theories are more entailed to suit- 
developed countries' environment than developing ones, as argued above. The main 
obstacles that can be pinpointed in Sub-Saharan Africa are underdevelopment and 
dependency problems, which make it harder fo r smooth integration arrangement to take 
place. Therefore, underdevelopment and dependence provide the most useful concepts fo r 
critical understanding o f the problems o f the region. I t  seeks to address the most pressing
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problems o f the less developed world in terms o f relations between developing countries 
themselves and w ith developed areas. In  brief, dependence is viewed as a peripheral 
form ation o f relation in the world system through which former colonies and other 
underdeveloped countries are exploited economically and their backwardness is maintained 
over time. I t  thus involves a situation where effective control over the economy o f a country 
lies outside that country. Ownership and control o f the productive elements o f the 'national' 
economy are held by Transnational Corporations/ Multinational Corporations that do not 
act in  the prim ary interests o f the local country o r region, the situation, which is presently 
facing Sub-Saharan Africa at the present time.
The process above has shaped the political economies o f most peripheral countries; 
Sub-Saharan Africa had its share, in such a way as to subject the development o f the region 
to the needs o f developed countries at the center. The result o f this kind o f arrangement/ 
dependency fo r any country o r region is continued uneven development, stagnation, 
unemployment, income inequality, regional disequHibria and low  integration among various 
economic sectors. The marginalization and exploitation is effected through an apparatus o f 
domination that in  dependent countries takes the form  o f an alliance between domestic and 
privileged groups and external interests and forces, all o f which benefit the status quo. In  
this situation, therefore, the applicability o f regional integration theories to the developing 
countries, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, is not a wise option. The region needs to find a 
way to eliminate all traits o f dependence and underdevelopment fo r the theories to work. 
Therefore, the best framework to look at Sub-Saharan Africa is through the dependency 
approach. I t  is through the dependency approach that we can understand both the 
elusiveness o f development and the co iiç le x ity  o f neo-colonial structures in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The approach brings into focus the interrelationship o f external and internal factors
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that facilitate and enrich the understanding o f the extent to which the dynamics o f the 
international politico-economic system affect the continued underdevelopment o f Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Most o f the regional integration arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
the goal o f collective self-reliance and disengagement o f the ir peripheral economies from  the 
international system. The objective o f dependency reduction would necessitate, first, the 
alteration o f traditional trade and investment relationships w ith  a view to making it possible 
fo r Sub-Saharan African countries to secure fu lle r control o f the ir economic and political 
destinies. Second, there is a need fo r deliberate restructuring o f the present mode o f 
production and adoption o f regional policies to regulate external linkages in the interest o f 
domestic development and also as well as some political restmcturing to pave the way fo r 
the above developments. Thus, an inçortan t aspect o f restructuring involves an increase in 
both the frequency and magnitude o f economic exchanges among Sub-Saharan African 
countries, including increased trade, improved communication links, ta riff reductions, 
industrial planning, technological acquisition, expansion o f educational and technical 
exchanges, and the exploitation o f natural resources on a sub-regional basis. Lastly, the 
regional arrangements should try  to eliminate the most common problems o f integration in 
Third W orld countries such as inter-regional rivalries, which make cooperation d ifficu lt. 
Further, restructuring o f im port substitution policies so that it  would not get in  the way o f 
regional market integration. Also a restructuring o f diversification o f economy so that there 
would be complementarity to exploit and not economies, which are too similar. In  this way, 
integration arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa wiU help to boost development o f the region 
and disengage from  the intemational system, which does not favor the region.
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HISTO R IC AL O VERVIEW  OF IN TE G R A TIO N  IN  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
In  Sub-Saharan Africa, integration has been in the forefront o f discussion since the 
massive movement toward independence in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. There was 
immediate recognition that, while independence had been the primary goal, African 
countries were largely artificial by-products o f colonial scramble and its subsequent division 
in 1884-85 at the Berlin Conference. Hence many African countries were too small to be 
economically viable and the transformation o f political into economic independence 
necessarily required concerted action.
In  the past three decades, all countries in  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have adopted a 
great number o f broadly defined regional integration (RI) schemes. According to some 
accounts, there are currently over th irty  Inter-Govemmental Organizations (IGOs) in West 
A frica alone. T te  aims o f RI schemes in SSA have ranged from  lim ited cooperation between 
neighboring states in specific areas to the creation o f an African common market. However, 
w ith in  all o f SSA, there are at present no more than seven o r eight IGOs that specifically aim 
at full-fledged economic integration.^ Against this bacl^round, it is not surprising that 
integration has been seen as a means o f helping to overcome the disadvantages o f s m all size, 
low  per capita incomes, small populations, and narrow resource bases, and o f making
Asante, S.K.B. 1986 “The political Economy o f Regionalism in .Africa; A decade o f  the Economic 
Com m unity o f  W est African States (ECOW AS)”, pg.26 
Foroutan, F. “Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: past experience and Future prospects” pg. 234
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possible a greater rate o f economic growth and development. I t  has also been seen as a 
means o f consolidating the political independence o f African countries and thereby 
strengthening their overall position vis-à-vis that o f developed countries, especially the 
form er metropolitan powers. In  brief, integration, whether economic or political, and 
cooperation in general, is not only desirable but it is necessary if  Africa is to industrialize, 
develop intra-African trade, reduce her dependency on vulnerable and fluctuating overseas 
markets, mobilize and maximize scarce resources o f capital and skills, and fina lly forge the 
way to effective African unity, both political and economic. This has been eloquently 
underscored by the Lagjs plan <f A cOon̂ °, which recognized the importance o f regional 
integration and cooperation as necessary instruments fo r pursuing the objectives o f national 
and collective self-reliance. Hence the discussions o f regionalism in  virtually every chapter o f 
the Lags plan (faction, including an integral condition o f implementation o f the plan.^'
The appeal o f some form  o f regional integration in SSA is almost intuitive. SSA 
countries are very small in  economic terms. In  1989, the Gross National Product (GNP) o f 
all SSA countries put together was approximately equal to that o f Belgium. They are also 
among the poorest in the World, with per capita GNP o f $340 in 1989, and are very poorly 
endowed w ith human and physical capital. Common sense thus dictates that fo r countries 
w ith such characteristics it is economically justified to integrate their markets. Imagine 
subdividing Belgium into fo rty  something independent countries, each w ith its own isolated 
goods and factor markets, a different public administration, currency, language, fiscal and
^  The Assembly of Heads of Stares and Governments of O A U  at its second extra-ordinary session held in 
Lagos, Nigeria on  April 28 and 29, 1990, which was devoted to the economic situation in Africa, adopted a 
Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa (the 
Lagos Plan of Action). The Lagos Plan of Action, among other things, called for measures to overcome the 
lack of information relating to the selection, acquisition and use of technology options by "supporting and 
strengthening African Regional Organizations in the field of Patent Information and Documentation 
Browne, R.S and Cummings, R.J 1984 “The Lagos plan o f  action vs. The Berg report: Contemporary 
Issues in A frican Economic Development”, Pg.37
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monetary authorities, army, plus a very inefficient inter-country transportation network 
Economist would contend that the welfare o f individuals would surely be reduced.
Before independence and the departure o f colonial powers in  Africa (Sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular), African leaders had realized the significance o f integration and 
cooperation. The historic All-Africans conference held in  Accra in December 1958 called fo r 
removal o f customs and other restrictions on trade among African countries and the 
conclusion o f multilateral payment agreements, w ith a view to enhancing the African 
common market^'. Since independence, African countries have attempted various forms o f 
collective self-reliance through regional economic cooperation as a means o f accelerating 
their socio-economic development. However, un til 1977 there were over 20 
intergovernmental multi-sectoral economic cooperation organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In  addition, about one hundred single sector multinational organizations were meant to 
promote technical and economic cooperation in Africa.^^ Many o f these were established in 
the 1960’s. Nevertheless, the decade was also characterized by the decline o f several regional 
groupings. For example, the East African Community (E A Q  experienced such acute tension 
in  the 1960’s that by the end o f the decade the level o f integration declined, and by June 
1977 the whole structure o f E AC  had disintegrated. The same happened to  the Customs and 
Economic Union o f Central Africa (U D EAQ , which was set up in January 1966. 
Restrictions on the opening o f markets and noncompliance w ith its rules denied it o f 
motivation to integrate the system So far, concrete achievements in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the field o f Regional Integration and Cooperation have been very modest or nonexistent. 
The question, w tich  arises here is, why so little  progress and such faltering steps? The 
problems and constraints o f African integration and cooperation are many, and seemingly
Mutharika, B 1972 "Toward multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa", P g .l2  
”  Adedeji, A 1977 "The need for Concrete Action, In Regional Cooperation in Africa", Pg. 10
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very d ifficu lt to cure o r even alleviate. In  brief, the problems arise from  the appeal o f 
national sovereignty and the d ifficu lty  in reaching acceptable formulas and procedures in 
which the costs and benefits o f integration and cooperation should be shared. In  addition, 
the failure o f political initiatives and declared collective goodwill to be matched by practical 
action causes concern. There are also mutual suspicions and differences o f political outlook 
arising from  heterogeneous cultures and varied colonial heritage. Fear o f being dominated by 
others and an insular view being imposed by ultra-nationalism are all delicate problems, 
which require tact and patience. Political and ideological cleavages also seem to threaten 
existing and otherwise viable integration and cooperation arrangements such as the defunct 
East African Community.^
Due to these key obstacles and constraints, the creation o f regional integration 
arrangement in Sub-Saharan Africa is often no more than a declaration o f intent and an 
indication o f continental alignment. Despite this disillusioning record, the fervor w ith which 
regional integration has been proposed as a response to the problems o f Africa has increased 
tremendously in recent years. Since the early 1970's, the world recession and its severe 
impact on economies around the world, particularly Africa, strengthened interest in the 
establishment o f new regional groups and the geographical extension o f existing ones. This 
trend was reinforced at the November 1984 O A U  summit where the African leaders 
reaffirmed in an irrçortant resolution their solemn commitment to put together their 
collective effort to implement the Lags plan < f action through the process o f regional 
integration and cooperation.^^ Hence, the past several years have wimessed the re-emergence 
o f a rash o f regional integration schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa as more or less explicit
Ibid, pg.32
OAU doc., "Resolution on Inter-African Econom ic Cooperation and Integration", Addis Ababa, 
AHG/Res. 131(20), Nov. 1984
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challenges to the external domination o f the continent inherited from  the colonial era. 
Among the most dynamic and ambitious regional arrangements are the ECOWAS 
(Economic Community o f West African states), SADC (Southern Africa Development 
Community, form erly know as SADCG Southern Africa Development Coordination 
Conference), PTA (Preferential Trade Area fo r Eastern and Southern African States), which 
later gave way to COMESA (Common Market fo r Eastern and Southern African States) and 
finally, the Libreville treaty o f October 1983 which established the Economic Community o f 
the States o f Central Africa (Œ E A Q , cotiçrising the present members o f UD EAC  and 
those o f the Economic Community o f Great Lakes. This was intended to be the Central 
African equivalent o f the ECOWAS.
The basic objective o f these new regional integration schemes is the same: to reduce 
dependence o f their respective member states on the external forces that seek to influence 
the economic policies and directions o f African states; to help improve the bargaining 
position o f African countries, thus contributing to their development potential through the 
broader strategy fo r promoting a N IE O  (New Intemational Economic Order); and to 
coordinate the development programs in the different sectors and sub-sectors as a means o f 
accelerating the rate o f economic growth.
The underlying premise is the desire by African states and leaders to determine as 
much as possible their own economic policies based on their national aspirations, natural 
resources, and political ideologies outside the influence o f developed countries. Yet, in 35 
years o f existence, what have the new regional integration schemes achieved so far? Because 
o f the recent emphasis on the concept o f collective self-reliance among developing 
countries, it  is too often assumed that any form  o f economic integration o r cooperation w ill 
have a positive impact on development. Schemes such as ECOWAS, PTA, SADC, or
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Œ E  AC  w ill not automatically lead to accelerated development. As Shaw and Grieve have 
warned, regional integration is not always an escape from  Africa's inheritance o f 
subordination, and it  may not advance disintegration from  the global economy.^” Indeed, 
w ithout a well-considered and intensive effo rt in restructuring the economy and without 
adequate planning, regional schemes may lead to regional inequalities and continued 
dependence.
Viewed from  this radical approach, w ith its focus on dependence and 
underdevelopment from  a global perspective, just how far have the new regional initiatives 
attempted to fundamentally restructure both national and regional political economies as the 
prerequisite fo r integration and development? O r to what extent have they, fo r example, 
initiated efforts toward intra regional trade or horizontal exchange in  order to overcome an 
inheritance o f vertical integration w ith form er metropolises, leading toward greater self- 
reliance at both national and collective levels? How  far have they effectively challenged the 
established pattern o f trade and division o f labor? Given such complex problems, although 
regional economic integration is certainly im portant as a means o f loosening the 
developmental constraints confronting Sub-Saharan African states, it  is unlikely to be an easy 
process. Then why, despite the strong appeal o f common sense o f this argument, has R I in 
SSA so far failed? Does this failure im ply that RI as a model o f development is harmful or, at 
best, ineffective fo r SSA and should be abandoned altogether, even as regionalism in the 
W orld appears to be gaining ground against muld-literalism? I t  is against this background 
that I  attempt to examine the initiatives, experience, progress and prospects o f regional 
integration schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Shaw, T .M  and Grieve, M .J "Dependence as an Approach to Understanding continuing Inequalities in 
Africa", Journal o f  Developing Areas, V o l.l3 , no.3 (April 1979): 243
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The objective o f this thesis is to accurately address these issues. To do so, five types 
o f integration are defined: goods market or trade integration; labor market integration; 
monetary integration; and integration o f government activity and regulation, alternatively 
known as cooperation. W ith the firs t three types o f integration, barriers to the free 
movement o f goods, services and factors o f production (labor and capital) are removed vis- 
à-vis partners so that the regional market is effectively unified. Monetary integration, at least 
in the context o f SSA, has implied the adoption o f a common central monetary authority 
and the surrender o f national autonomy in the fie ld  o f monetary and exchange policy. 
Regulation and government activity integration implies adoption o f sim ilar tax and 
investment codes, harmonization o f administrative and bureaucratic rules, creation o f jo int 
administration such as a common customs administration, creation o f a common 
infrastructure and the provision o f common services, such as a common c iv il aviation, 
multinational universities and research centers and so forth.
In  the specific context o f SSA, this classification o f integration is preferable to the 
classical taxonomy o f regional arrangements (free trade area, customs unions, common 
markets, monetary union and political unification) because it allows each o f these possible 
cases o f integration to occur in conjunction with, o r separately from , the others. For 
example, in SSA, monetary union in  the CFA Franc zone exists w ithout an effective 
integration o f goods and factors markets. In  the classical taxonomy, monetary integration 
would naturally come as the last step towards the creation o f a full-fledged economic union.
One o f the greatest weaknesses o f integration schemes in SSA is that most o f them 
have focused mainly on trade integration.^^ The other forms o f integration are seen as a 
distant goal in  SSA. However, structural characteristics o f SSA economies, the pursuit of
Foroutan, F "Regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past experience and fiitture prospects", in De 
Melo and Panagariya " New Dimensions In Regional Integration", pg.239
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im port-substitution policies, and the very uneven distribution o f costs and benefits o f 
integration arising from  economic differences among the partner countries, have so far 
prevented any meaningful trade integration in SSA. Moreover, as the experience o f the 
form er Eastern European bloc suggests, there is no theoretical o r empirical reason to believe 
that an inçort-substituting trade integration strategy, even w ten successfully implemented, 
would have irrçroved welfare.̂ ® O ther forms o f integration, especially government activity 
and regulation integration, as well as trade integration when pursued as a complement rather 
than as substitute fo r global trade liberalization, may nevertheless help SSA economies to 
overcome the current economic difficulties by providing an enabling environment to those 
SSA producers that begin conçeting in the world markets. However, the extent o f structural 
characteristics o f SSA countries and their economic differences can only change gradually 
complete trade and labor market integration remain at this point a medium to long term 
objectives.
Regional Integration Schemes in SSA 
There are few (not more than eight) groupings in  SSA that aim at fully-fledged 
integration. Some o f these groupings date back to the colonial era. However, most 
integration schemes were adopted after independence during the period that runs from  the 
late 1960's to the early 1980's. On many occasions the groupings comprised countries, which 
had shared colonial ties to the same foreign power because the colonial ties had created a 
host o f common institutions, a common officia l language, and a common currency. In other 
instances, the regional groupings, notably the larger ones, were more in line w ith the 
geographical proxim ity o f the member countries. A  brief overview o f the major groupings in
Ibid, pg.239
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West, Central, East and Southern Africa w ill demonstrate what I  have tried to explain above. 
The intent is to highlight the historic circumstances that gave rise to the various groupings, 
the economic characteristics o f the participating countries, and the objectives and 
achievements o f the various groupings.
West Africa
There are three intportant regional integration schemes in West Africa. The 
Economic Commumty o f Western African States (ECOWAS), the Communauté 
Economique de 1' Afrique de l'Ouest (Œ A O ) and the Mano-River Union (MRU). A  fourth 
regional integration scheme, the Sene-Gambian Federation, between the republics o f Senegal 
and the Gambia, ended in acrimony in 1989.
Economic Community o f West African States (ECOWAS)
The Economic Community o f West African States was established on the 28'*’ o f 
M ay 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. The idea o f a community embracing all Westem Africa dates 
back to the m id-1960. Particularly Nigeria, out o f conviction that a broader community 
would help her reduce dependence on o il and increase her influence in a French dominated 
region promoted the idea. Anticipating the prospect o f expanded markets and the 
opporturuty to compete on more favorable terms w ith multinational corporations. West 
African private business enterprises, especially the Nigerian ones, also provided strong 
support to the creation o f ECOWAS^’ . The main objective was o f ECOWAS to promote 
cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment o f an economic union in West 
A frica in  order to raise the living standards o f its people, and to m aintain and enhance
Okolo, J.E  and Wright, S (eds) 1990 "W est African regional cooperation and Development", pg .l4
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economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and 
development o f the African continent at large.
ECOWAS is composed o f sixteen West African countries. These states have an 
estimated total GNP o f $68 billion and a population o f 198 m illion according to 1996 
records. A  wealth o f mineral resources and a vast variety o f agricultural products, allows 
ECOWAS to be among the largest and the most diversified economic community in SSA. 
Nevertheless, it  is s till poor and economically underdeveloped. The average GNP per capita 
in  1989 was only $326 and economic activity concentrated heavily on extractive industry and 
agriculture fo r exports. For example, fourteen out o f the sixteen members o f ECOWAS 
receive over 60% o f their revenues from  one or two commodities. Despite these common 
characteristics, the ECOWAS members are more different than sim ilar The most striking 
example is Nigeria whose population and GNP are roughly equal to that o f the other fifteen 
members put together.
The economic differences among ECOWAS members are exacerbated by cultural, 
historical and politica l disparities. Historic ties to different colonial powers have given rise to 
three officia l languages, English, French and Portuguese, different currencies, fiscal codes 
and public administration structures and practices. Additionally, the relations between the 
countries are marked by long standing territorial disputes and political rivalries. Added to 
this is the extreme political instability in most o f the member countries, which has caused 
frequent and violent changes in  political leadership. The ECOWAS treaty o f 1975 
envisaged the creation o f a common market among member states w ith a phased reduction 
o f tariffs and non-tariff barriers on products o f community origin until their conçlete
For instance, o f  the seventy-two successful coups d'etat in Africa during 1958-89, the majority took place 
in five o f  the sixteen ECOWAS states.
For a detailed discussion on this, see. Welsh, C.E 1990 "The M ilitary factor in W est Africa: Leadership and 
Regional Development", in Okolo and Wright (eds) 1990.
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elimination fo r all categories o f goods and all countries by 1989; the establishment o f 
Common external ta riff by 1994; fiscal and monetary harmonization; and close cooperation 
in all areas o f economic activity. Moreover, at the Dakar meeting in  1979, ECOWAS 
members agreed to allow a "free movement o f persons" and to establish a common defense 
pact. Finally, the Fund fo r Cooperation, Compensation and Development ÇFCCD) was 
supposed to alleviate the negative impact o f integration and ta riff preferences on the least 
developed members.
However, today, twenty-five years since the establishment o f ECOWAS the above 
goals have yet to be met. Trade liberalization and the establishment o f a common external 
ta riff are yet to be implemented; expulsion o f fore%n workers from  Nigeria in 1983 and 
1985 proved the political impossibility o f removing restrictions on labor movements; and the 
contributions to and outlays from  the FCCD are subject to eternal controversy. The poverty 
o f ECOWAS members, the homogenous structure o f their economies, the economic, 
cultural, political and ideological differences among them as well as political instability o f 
many member states explain why the ECOWAS treaty has remained a dead letter.
Mano River Union (MRU)
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone are linked in this all-but-defunct body called the 
Mano River Union, which was set up fo r promotion o f cooperation and integration in 1973. 
The union's main objectives included the expansion o f trade among member countries 
through the elim ination o f existing barriers; the creation o f a common protection policy vis- 
à-vis the rest o f the world; and the promotion o f economic cooperation. Although in theory 
intra- M RU trade is ta riff free and a common external ta riff was established, trade among 
member states remains restricted by pervasive non-tariff and ta riff equivalent barriers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
Moreover, despite the lack o f marked differences among the members that is often a 
distinguishing feature o f the larger organizations in the sub-region, progress towards 
integration and intra-regional trade is slowed by political unrest in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
and the lack o f complimentarity among the partners’ production structures/' A fte r nearly a 
decade o f "death" the Mano River Union started some initiatives fo r the revival o f the 
scheme in A pril 2001. Hoping after the successful peace negotiation in Sierra Leone, the 
Union w ill lay some grounds fo r further development o f the scheme.*’
Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Œ AO )
Œ A O  represents the th ird  attempt by the West African states that belonged to the 
form er federation o f French Westem Africa to maintain arrangements fo r monetary and 
economic cooperation, which were established during the colonial era. Despite past failures 
in creating a custom union, the member states preserved the ir monetary union by adhering 
to the Œ A  Franc zone. The desire o f France to preserve its influence in the sub-region and 
to counter the growing power o f Nigeria played a crucial role in maintenance o f monetary 
and economic ties. Œ A O  was established in 1973 by a treaty signed in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 
and comprises seven member countries o f Burkina Faso, Ivo ry Coast, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, and Benin, which became member in 1984. A ll the member countries w ith 
the exception o f Mauritania also belong to the West African monetary union (UMOA) and 
to ECOWAS.
The Œ A O  countries are characterized by varying degrees o f economic 
development, w ith Ivo ry Coast and Senegal representing the relatively industrialized poles o f
*' For a detailed account o f  obstacles to economic integration in MRU see, Sesay, A 1990 "Obstacles to 
Intra-union Trade in the M ano River Union" chapter 4 in Okolo and W right (eds) 1990.
*■ Africa news online, May 15'*’, 2000.
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the group. Because the economic imbalances among the Œ A O  members had been the 
major cause o f the dissolution o f earlier initiatives, the treaty o f Abidjan embodied specific 
measures to attenuate such imbalances by directly assisting the economic development of the 
poorest countries w ithin the group. The Community Development Fund was created to 
compensate member countries fo r the loss o f ta riff revenues arising from  ta riff preferences 
to partners, while the Solidarity fund largely financed by Ivo ry Coast and Senegal is to 
finance development projects in the most depressed regions. Moreover, the structure o f 
ta riff preferences to partners is tailored to accommodate the request fo r higher protection by 
the least developed member states. These measures do have some positive effects in 
prom oting intra-trade and factor mobility, both o f which are high by SSA standards. 
Nevertheless, they also contribute to the creation o f an extraordinarily distorted structure o f 
incentives. Moreover, intra-CEAO trade in goods and services is far from  being free o f 
restrictions and a common extemal protection policy is yet to be formulated.*^
Central Africa
The Customs and Economic Union o f Central Africa (UDEAC), perpetuates the 
long- standing tradition o f cooperation among the form er French Central African countries. 
U D EA C  was form ally established in 1973 w ith the treaty o f Brazzaville and the scheme 
comprised six member states o f Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo- 
Brazzaville, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony that acceded to the 
umon in  1985. The original treaty o f Brazzaville envisages a customs and monetary union 
w ith the conçlete removal o f internal tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers and the 
establishment o f common extemal tariffs and a common customs administration fo r trade
*̂  UNDP, H um an Development Report 1992, Oxford University Press, pg.59-64
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with the rest o f the W orld. However, the treaty was extensively revised in 1974. This caused 
the de facto abolition o f the common extemal ta riff and the common customs union 
administration. While intra-union trade in manufactured goods was restricted to those 
produced by firms enjoying the privilege o f Taxe Unique (TU) system. The direct result o f 
TU  system has been a structure o f ta riff preferences that varies w ith firm , product, country^ 
o f origin and country o f destination. As in Œ A O , this structure o f ta riff preferences has 
proven to be both highly distortionary and a major obstacle towards any meaningful 
integration o f member countries' goods markets. In  terms o f per capita income, UDEAC is 
the second richest grouping in SSA. However, considerable differences exist among member 
countries. Cameroon is a semi-industrialized country where manufacturing contributes 14% 
o f GDP, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon heavily relies on petroleum extraction. By SSA 
standards, all the three countries have reasonable levels o f per capita incomes. O n the other 
hand. Central African Republic, Chad and Equatorial Guinea rely heavily on agriculture and 
are among the poorest nations in the group.
East and Southern Africa
There are four important regional groupings in East and Southern Africa, The 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Common Market fo r Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and The East 
African Cooperation (EAQ , which revived after its collapse in 1977.
Southern African Development Community (SADQ
O riginally known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCQ, the organization was formed in Lusaka, Zambia, on A p ril 1", 1980, following the
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adoption o f the Lusaka Declaration by nine Southern African countries, it  works towards 
economic liberation w ithin the region. The Declaration and treaty establishing the Southern 
African Development Community (SADQ, which has replaced the Coordination 
Conference, was signed on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. Member states are 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic o f Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Each member state has a responsibility to coordinate a sector o r sectors on 
behalf o f the others.
Hawever, before its transformation to SADC, SADCC had one principal objective, 
which was to promote cooperation among its member states in  order to lessen their 
economic dependence on the form er South African government. Thus, from  the beginning, 
the architects o f SADCC decided to reject the idea o f a custom union and concentrate their 
efforts on the more modest goal o f economic cooperation, which changed after the 
admission o f a “ non-racial”  Republic o f South Africa. Sim ilarly, they avoided the 
establishment o f a highly centralized and expensive bureaucracy by creating a small 
secretariat w ith lim ited coordination duties while leaving the responsibility fo r various 
sectors to the member-states.**
The entry o f a democratic, non-racial South Africa into SADC gave a major boost to 
efforts already underway to promote regional integration and cooperation in Southern 
Africa. I t  greatly enlarged the overall size o f the regional market and created new 
opportumties fo r cooperation in many ways*\ However, South A frica’s admission into 
SADC by itself did not, automatically resolve the problems created by the acute imbalances, 
inequities and patterns o f domination and dependency that characterized existing regional
SADC handbook 1998, published by SADC secretariat 
Ibid.
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relations in Southern Africa. Since its inception, SADC saw these as barriers to balanced 
growth and development in  the sub-continent. The current dominance o f South African 
economy over the rest o f the regional economy is both undesirable and unacceptable even 
w ith the new South Africa as a member o f the organization. I t  was precisely to redress this 
economic imbalance, among other reasons, that SADC was established.
SADC conceives that a negotiation process aimed at reconstructing regional relations 
along new lines should involve fu ll and frank exchanges both about existing interactions and 
possible new relations in various sectors. Moreover, the scheme has put out some important 
principles as guidelines fo r the group. For instance, the principle o f mutual benefit, which 
means that all partners, including stronger ones, should legitimately expect to benefit 
materially from  the new arrangement that emerged in  the region. The principle o f equity 
implies a willingness to recognize a number o f existing relations and the need to act together 
to place these relations on a new footing. The principle o f interdependence means 
recognition by all member states that the fate o f the entire region is interiinked and that 
growth and development throughout the region is the interest o f all. Despite its limitations, 
SADC has been considered by many inside and outside the region as a successful example o f 
regional integration to emulate elsewhere in  SSA.
Common Market fo r Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
The history o f COMESA began in December 1994, when it  was formed to replace 
the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which had existed from  earlier days o f 1981. 
Common Market fo r Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established as an 
organization o f free independent sovereign states which agreed to cooperate in developing 
their natural and human resources fo r the good o f all the ir people and as such it  has a wide
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ranging series o f objectives, which necessarily include in its priorities the promotion o f peace 
and security in the region. However, due to COMESA’s economic history and background 
its main focus has been on the formation o f a large economic and trading unit that is capable 
o f overcoming some o f the major economic barriers facing individual member states. The 
formation o f PTA and later COMESA was one o f the main initiatives by the U N  Economic 
Commission fo r Africa (ECA). ECA has been actively promoting regionalism in Africa as 
the only viable strategy fo r the continent’s development. According to ECA, regional 
groupings in Africa should comprise a large number o f countries in order to provide 
sufficiently large markets fo r the creation o f industries that would gradually substitute 
imports and promote Africa’s self sufficiency.** According to this view, no more than four 
such regional groupings should exist in  Africa: North, west. Central, East and South. Thus 
COMESA, like its counterpart in western Africa, ECOWAS, received the active support o f 
the ECA.
The COMESA treaty explicitly recognizes the establishment o f an economic 
community as its ultimate goal. The creation o f a preferential trade area is to be considered 
as only a first step towards that goal. In itia lly, common lists o f 212 categories o f goods were 
selected fo r preferential treatment w ith in the sub-region. The original intention is to 
gradually expand the list to comprise all goods o f COMESA origin. Yet since PTA the 
arrangement has experienced some problems.**' Members fa il to negotiate on what goods to 
include in the list, how to define the rules o f origin, and how to create compensatory 
mechanisms fo r those members that would suffer revenue losses. As a result, they failed to 
reach a target deadline fo r effective liberalization o f trade, and shifted from  1992 to at least
** Hall, S. 1987 "The preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States: Strategy, progress 
and Problems", working paper. 453, institute o f  Developm ent Studies, University O f Nairobi, Kenya.
*’ Ibid.
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the end o f 2000, however, even this appeared to be real optim istic. The lack o f quicker 
progress w ith intra-group trade liberalization in COMESA is due to the same factors that 
have been slowing down ECOWAS. Although in  economic terms COMESA is the second 
largest grouping in  SSA, all o f its members are highly dependent on one or two commodities 
fo r their export revenues. The ensuing lack o f complementarities and uneven distribution of 
benefits have so far stalled all efforts towards any meaningful and effective integration.
Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU)
Southem Africa Custom Union is the oldest and most functional custom union 
arrangement in SSA, Southem Africa Custom Union comprises South Africa and the BLS 
states o f Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. A fte r its independence in 1990, Namibia also 
joined the union.** The union was created in 1910, soon after the Republic o f South Africa 
was form ally created as an independent state, and the new union itself replaced an older one, 
which has been in existence since 1889. The main feature o f SACU is the overwhelming 
dominance o f South Africa over the other four members. Three countries (Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland) are exceedingly small and economically poor while Namibia is still a 
young nation w ith economy depending on minerals fo r export revenues.*’  Goods and factors 
markets are well integrated w ithin SACU, and there is a common extemal ta riff (CET) and a 
common excise tax, o f which the proceeds are paid into a Consolidated Revenue Fund. The 
union members share revenues in  proportion to their percentage o f total trade. Under the 
1969 revenue-sharing formulas as compensation fo r leaving trade, industry and fiscal 
decisions entirely to South Africa, the BLS states receive from  the Fund more than their
** Henderson, R.D 1985 "The Southern African Customs Union: Politics o f  dependence", in R. Onwuka 
and A. Sesay (eds), "The future o f  Regionalism in Africa".
*’ Ibid.
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contributions to the Fund. A ll SACU members except Botswana are also members o f Rand 
Monetary Area, w ith the central bank o f South Africa acting as the central bank o f the Area 
as a whole. The union does not have any institutional structure such as a secretariat; there is 
only a functional commission, which meets once a year to consider any issues. However, 
since 1989, w ith the Republic o f South A frica experiencing dramatic changes internally and 
externally, many observers have strong feelings that SACU may not survive in  its present 
form, either in terms o f membership or in terms o f trade and monetary arrangements. There 
is great change on the way.^
East African Community (EAQ
In  the past, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have enjoyed a long history o f cooperation 
under successive regional arrangements, including the customs union between Kenya and 
Uganda in 1917, which the then Tanganyika (now Tanzania after independence and union 
w ith Zanzibar) later joined in 1927; the East African High Commission 1948-1961; the East 
African Common Services Organization 1961-1967 and the East African Community 1967- 
1977. Before its revival last year, the East African Community collapsed in  1977 due to  both 
internal and external factors, which were not supportive o f regional integration at that time. 
However, follow ing the signing o f a mediation agreement fo r the D ivision o f Assents and 
Liabilities in  1984, the three countries agreed to explore areas o f future cooperation and 
work out concrete arrangements fo r such cooperation. Subsequent meetings o f the three 
Heads o f State led to the signing o f the Agreement establishing the Permanent Tripartite 
Commission fo r East African Cooperation on November 30, 1993. Operations o f the East 
African Cooperation (an inter-govemmental organization w ith  the mandate to promote
Venter, D. 1998 "South African Policy in  Time o f  Change: The African Dimension", Journal o f  the Third 
W orld Spectrum  5, no 2 (fall).
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regional integration and development among the three countries) started on March 14, 1996, 
follow ing the launching o f the secretariat at its headquarters in  Arusha, Tanzania/' In  order 
to consolidate cooperation between the three states, the Agreement on cooperation was 
upgraded to a Treaty, which was signed August 1999 and o ffic ia lly  launched the New East 
African Com m unity/’ I t  is now just over three years since the o ffic ia l signing and launching 
o f the new East African Community, but things seems to be going a little  slow fo r the 
Community to have an impact on the development o f the sub region. A t the signing o f the 
Treaty, the Community envisioned a better and expanded trading environment. The three 
governments promised to promote investment codes by protecting property rights and 
proper regulation o f the private sector. Moreover, the agenda fo r cooperation also included; 
conservation efforts and sustainable utilization o f w ildlife w ith in the community, tourism; 
and defense, security and peacekeeping matters. Other approved projects include the 
harmonization o f m ilitary training syllabi as well as the integration o f m ilitary schools, 
m ilitary research and production facilities .'̂ Nevertheless, as most o f the regional integration 
schemes in SSA, EAC has the same problems to confront. The three member states have 
poor policy formulation, which hinders rather than encourages trade, which is the quickest 
route to wealth creation. The economies are too similar, hence no complementarities to 
exploit. In ç o rt substitution policies get in the way o f regional market integration. In  
addition, inter-regional rivalries make cooperation d ifficu lt (taking into consideration the 
current Great Lakes crisis, which Uganda is involved, Tanzania and Kenya acts as mediators) 
and thus slowing down most o f the cooperation efforts.
EAC handbook published by Secretariat o f  the com mission for East African Cooperation, Arusha, 
Tanzania
The East A frican (Editorial), "Budgeting for Disintegration", Monday, June 19. 2000.
”  Ibid.
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CHAPTER m
CHALLENGES FACING  THE PURSUIT OF R EG IO N AU SM  IN  SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
Many sub-Saharan Africa leaders advocate regionalism as an effective strategy fo r 
stimulating development in the region. The process o f forging regionalism in sub-Saharan 
Africa involves many interrelated challenges. Some o f these, such as over-dependence on 
foreign funds and a lack o f real political commitment, are generally found in sub-Saharan 
Africa and thus act as a blocking factor to the growth o f regionalism in the region. The 
discussion here, however, focuses on the manifestation o f these problems in regional 
integration and regionalism as a whole.
The Movement toward Regionalism in SSA 
I t  is perhaps easier to argue that the readiness to accept regionalism as a strategy fo r 
development is an asset and not a problem fo r sub-Saharan Africa. However, given that this 
strategy is seemingly unquestioned and is accepted categorically, governments may neglect to 
conduct in-depth evaluations o f the potential impact o f joining a regional bloc. I t  seems that 
many countries in the region jo in any and all regional blocs to whom they have access, 
w ithout carefully assessing the costs and benefits o f getting involved in that particular 
regional bloc.^ As pointed out in the previous chapter, some countries belong to more than
R.E. M shomba, 2000 ‘Africa in the Global Econom y’ p g .l7 5 -1 8 l
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three regional blocs, thus creating a m ultip licity o f intergovernmental organizations. For 
example, data shows that the membership o f eastern and southern African countries can be 
traced in  seven regional blocs, each country being involved in more than one bloc, while in 
western Africa, two regional blocs share overlapping membership and the trend is the same 
in  central African states where there are three regional blocs.
Theoretical models and empirical studies confirm  that moving toward free trade is 
beneficial to participatirg countries in these regional arrangements. Thus, one could 
conclude that decisions to form  or to jo in a regional bloc, even if  done without fu ll 
consideration o f the costs and benefits are still beneficial to these countries. The problem, 
however, is that such regional blocs may lack the commitment and clear direction usually 
borne out o f careful evaluations. Such evaluation, often prorrçted by critical disagreement, 
can be preempted by nonchalant political unanimity.”  I t  appears that regionalism in sub- 
Saharan Africa is as popular in 1990’s as im port substitution was in the 1970’s. In  the I970’s, 
many sub-Saharan Africa countries did not have carefully designed programs fo r im port 
substitution, in  spite o f the overwhelming support fo r the strategy all over the region. A t that 
time frame, many policies were implemented in the name o f im port substitution even when 
they were effectively working against it.”  Although im port substitution, as an economic 
strategy, is not on par w ith regionalism or economic integration in general, regionalism or 
economic integration also suffers from  a lack o f commitment and clear direction just as the 
im port substitution did. However, politicians and government officials happen to like the 
idea o f regionalism more, because they are personally benefiting from  attending summits and
S.K.B. Asante, 1986 ‘The Political Economy o f Regionalism in Africa: A  decade o f  the Economic 
Com munity o f  W est A frican States (ECOWAS) pg. 19-20
Also see Aparajita Biswas, ‘Some Reflections on the classical M odels o f  Regional Integration in Southern 
A frica' Africa Quarterly, Vol.39, #4, 1999 
See Percy S. Mistry, ‘A frica’s Record o f  Regional Cooperation and Integration’ African Affairs, 2000 
pg.559
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other regional activities. Nevertheless, many do not have a clear understanding o f the 
political and financial commitment necessary to achieve any meaningful integration. 
However, not all politicians opt fo r regionalism because o f the positive impact it m ight have 
on the region. Rather, some opt fo r it because they th ink the in ta c t o f regionalism or 
integration is fa r removed from  their constituencies. Some opt fo r it  because o f the 
perceived relevance o f integration or because they assume that regionalism w ill not have 
much impact. In  other words, some have a very cavalier attitude and sim ply ‘go w ith the 
crowd.’ Worse, some policy makers may be in favor o f integration only fo r their personal 
benefits, such as international travel and generous per diems that can be obtained even in an 
ailing regional bloc.^'" The point here is not that the disagreement about regionalism is 
necessarily good fo r integration, rather an uninformed, quick, unanimous decision to jo in  a 
regional bloc can be less effective than a delayed, challenged and carefully considered 
decision to do so. Since regionalism seems to be accepted at face value, many politicians and 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa do not engage in effective debate and analysis in these 
regional blocs.
Lack o f Political Commitment
There are two im portant scenarios that appear in regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, 
one the act o f jo ining o r deciding to establish a regional bloc and two, actual implementation 
o f policies and allocation o f resources that would bring about integration. However, there 
are two main issues 'wdiich trouble integration in sub-Saharan Africa. One, agreements are 
reached, but some countries do not honor them, even though they are party to the 
agreements. Second, in many regional groupings in sub-Saharan Africa the functions o f the
”  R.E. M shom ba, 2000 ‘Africa in the global econom y’ pg. 193
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secretariats are severely constrained because member states do not pay the ir dues on time or 
honor their commitments/* The main reason fo r the lack o f political commitment goes 
beyond economic o r political integration. Many sub-Saharan African countries lack political 
accountability. Political and govenunent leaders are not held accountable fo r the ir statements 
o r fo r the agreements they sign. A t the launching o f the Secretariat fo r the East African Co­
operation on March 14, 1996, President Daniel Arap M oi o f Kenya spoke not only o f 
creating a customs union but also o f form ing a federation. Although such a vision is neither 
new nor totally uruealistic, it is unlikely that anyone took his statements seriously. A  leader 
vho  has not manifested a genuine intention to listen to or bring together opposing parties in 
his own country can hardly be taken seriously in  suggesting a politica lly unified East Africa.
Often government leaders commit their countries to agreements w ithout having to 
justify such decisions to their public. Furthermore, they are not held internally accountable 
fo r failing to implement such decisions.'’’  In  some cases, governments are held accountable 
externally by the institutions that administer the agreements. That is the situation, fo r 
example, with the W TO (World Trade Organization) agreements. Regional grouping in sub- 
Saharan Africa, however, take painstaking precautions not to offend any country, so punitive 
measures for those who fa il o r even refuse to honor agreements are m inor and infrequent. 
Moreover, some groups take too much pride in  the number o f their members to worry 
about commitment o f those members, as such, countries are neither held internally or 
externally accountable. For example, a country may agree to reduce tariffs on intra-regional 
trade, only to say a few months later, sometimes w ith the blessing o f the secretariat, that it 
cannot do so because such action w ill reduce its revenues. Countries set group objectives
** See reports by UNCTAD, 1992:2, 1996:9 
S.K.B. Asante, 1997 ‘Regionalism  and A frica’s Development-Expectations, Reality and Challenges’ pg. 
80
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without linking them to national policies.'*' Countries jo in a multitude o f regional blocs 
w ith in the same region and w ith sim ilar objectives, thus duplicating activities and increasing 
the financial burden to them. Hence, many sub-Saharan African countries fa il to pay their 
budgetary contributions to these organizations, and still no one holds the governments in 
these countries accountable fo r such costly and unproductive decisions.
Over-dependence on Foreign Donors
One o f the potential dynamic consequences o f regionalism is the political and 
economic leverage it can accord countries in multilateral negotiations. This potential is 
compromised, however by too much dependence on foreign donors or, as they are often 
called, fore%n partners. Over 85% o f financial resources fo r SADC projects come from  
foreign sources. Part o f the rivalry between regional groups such as COMESA and SADC or 
between ECOWAS and its subgroup, UEM OA, is over foreign donors. For instance, all 
UEM O A member states, except one, are francophone countries and, as such, are in a better 
position to secure more financial support from  France.'"'
IG A D D  was restructured into IG A D  in  part to attract foreign partners. The 
restructuring itself was done with guidance from  foreign partners. Some o f IG A D ’s technical 
meetings are held in the country that chairs IG A D ’s foreign forum  (Italy was the chair in 
1998), and paid fo r by the foreign partners. This situation is not typical o f other regional 
groups in sub-Saharan Africa, but such a setting is not conducive to providing leverage fo r 
Africans. I t  does not allow self-determination, which is often considered the ultimate 
objective o f integration in sub-Saharan Africa. Projects are proposed not only by assessing 
the needs in  the region but also by determining which ones have a higher probability o f
“  Ibid.. pg.74-75
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being funded by foreign partners. The dependence on o r the anticipation o f foreign funds 
may explain, in  part, why some countries jo in  many regional blocs and why regional groups 
in  sub-Saharan Africa are set on unrealistic schedules. Countries jo in many regional groups 
to be sure they get a piece o f every‘pie’ coming from  foreign donors into the region. Groups 
set unrealistic schedules to impress donors and to qualify fo r the funds. Sub-Saharan Africa 
needs assistance and should get assistance from  the rest o f the world when it is tru ly  fo r 
economic development. However, fo r a development strategy principally grounded in self- 
determination, African countries are supposed to have ownership responsibility both fo r the 
costs and direction o f the programs in their regional blocs. Undoubtedly, this approach 
would significandy scale down the size o f the secretariat units and the number o f projects. 
Such an approach might not necessarily undermine the speed o f genuine integration in sub- 
Saharan Africa. In  fact, it m ight enhance regionalism by eliminating from  regional blocs 
those opportunisric countries that jo in only to tap foreign funds.
Foreign Countries’ Dominance
As indicated in  the previous chapter, developed countries also often play a bigger 
role in  the ongoing over-dependence o f sub-Saharan African countries on foreign aid. The 
scramble fo r African resources by the developed world did not end w ith political 
independence fo r African countries. Some developed countries continue to devise strategies 
that would maintain the pattern o f trade created by co lonialism, whereby sub-Saharan 
African countries export unprocessed prim ary products and import manufactured products. 
Furthermore, the trade between sub-Saharan African countries and the rest o f the world is 
s till dictated by the market forces o f supply and demand. The strategies o f developed 
countries to sub-Saharan African countries are usually hard to resist because they are coated
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with sweeteners such as ‘assistance funds’, which are needed in  sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, A frican leaders who focus only on the short term  o f the donor's assistance have a 
d ifficu lt time avoiding such engagement that later hurt the specific country.
Some African scholars argue that France has weakened ECOWAS w ith its 
controlling support o f its form er West African colonies. The member states o f CEAO and 
its successor, UEM OA, find it  more comfortable to rely on their form er master, France, 
than to work on building economic cooperation w ith the ir Anglophone neighbors.*’ In  1998, 
some members o f US. congress proposed FLR. 1432, the African G row th and O pportunity 
Act. The b ill was designed to encourage more trade between the United States and sub- 
Saharan African countries. I t  was quite interesting to note that the b ill proposed the 
establishment o f a U.S-sub-Saharan African free trade area. Sub-Saharan Africa obviously is 
not in a position to establish a free trade area w ith the United States, when neither sub- 
Saharan Africa as a region nor SSA sub-regional groups have yet succeeded in achieving that 
level o f integration. Indeed, the schedule fo r integration in  Africa as envisioned by the Abuja 
Treaty targets the achievement o f a free trade area fo r the continent by the year 2016. 
Considering the trend o f economic integration in sub-regional groups, this projection itself is 
very ambitious; let alone trying to integrate the whole sub-Saharan Africa region w ith the 
United States.
Nonetheless, the meager assistance stipulated in  the b ill made it irresistible to many 
countries. In  addition, the b ill appeared to represent an im portant departure from  an ‘aid’ 
strategy to a ‘trade’ strategy arrangement. Many African diplomats in Washington, D .C , 
testified in  favor o f the b ill. Offers o f free trade partnership from  developed countries, w ith 
many indirect efforts in sub-Saharan Africa from  sub-regional and continental cooperation.
"  ibid., pg. 197
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This happens especially as each country (or each sub-regional group, fo r that matter) 
attempts to draw most o f the attention to itself fo r the most assistance. I f  sub-Saharan 
African countries were honest w ith themselves and the United States, they would have 
expressed their appreciation fo r the initiative and affirmed their belief in economic 
integration while explaining that it  was too soon to discuss the free trade area with the 
United States. They would also have pursued the fact that the U.S. offer o f ‘partnership’ did 
not include N orth Africa, whereas the goal o f the Organization o f African Unity is to 
integrate the entire continent. The European Union, which already has a strong trade link  to 
Africa, prepared a summit w ith A frica in  the year 2000. Assuredly, the focus o f the summit 
was on the irrçortance o f trade and investment in the continent. However, African countries 
must be careful to avoid gazing at the EU  and other such bodies, waiting fo r assistance, 
rather than working diligently to build cooperation among themselves.
Unrealistic Schedules
Making implementation projections is an inçortan t part o f programming. However, 
such schedules must be realistic, and commitments to keep to the schedule must be binding. 
Some countries ‘com m it’ to a schedule to reduce trade barriers either w ithout any real 
intention o f doing so or before they make adequate evaluations o f the impact o f the 
reductions. There are countries whose intra-group imports are less than 5% o f their total 
imports that claim that reducing tariffs on intra-group trade would have a severe impact on 
their governmental revenue. This is one o f the excuses given by OOMESA and ECOWAS 
countries fo r failing to bring tariffs down to their scheduled levels. Even if  these excuses 
were valid, it  would s till leave one wondering why the revenue problem could not have been 
anticipated before the agreement was reached. Perhaps, as already noted, it  is because some
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agreements are reached prim arily as a strategy to draw financial support from  donors/^
Fear o f Uneven D istribution o f Benefits
Countries in  sub-Saharan Africa and in each o f the regional economic groups vary 
considerably in basic economic and social indicators. Foroutan (1992) described economic 
differences among sub-Saharan African countries as the major obstacle to realizing trade and 
integration in general. These economic differences cause concern that the benefits o f 
integration w ill gravitate toward those countries whose manufacturing sectors are relatively 
more developed, such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius in OOMESA; South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in  SADQ Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal in ECOWAS; and Cameroon 
in ECCAS. These concerns have given rise to two major phenomena that have undermined 
the integration process itself: compensation schemes and selective liberalization schemes.*’
In  regard to compensation schemes, ECOWAS stipulates that member countries w ill 
be compensated fo r their loss o f im port duties resulting from  the reduction o f tariffs on 
processed and industrial products. ** Although such compensation schemes may sound 
altruistic, they do not work (except to the extent that they restrain integration, thereby 
removing the need to have them). I t  is nearly impossible to formulate an effective remedy in 
which contributions are allocated into the compensation fund. More important, focus on the 
loss o f im port revenues neglects the positive impact o f reduced tariffs to consumers and on 
the efficient allocation o f resources. Even if  losses o f ta riff revenues on intra-group trade 
cannot be sustained, then countries should reduce tariffs more gradually rather than setting 
ambitious ta riff reduction schedules that are sure to be ignored or compensatory schemes
“  For further discussion see, A.S. Bhalla and P. Bhalla, 1997 ‘Regional B locs’ pg. 40-67
*** F. Faezeh, 1992 ‘Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan A frica.’ In ‘New dimensions in Regional
Integration,’ edited by Jaime de M elo and Arvind Panagariya, pg. 234-271
“  ECOW AS secretariat, 1993: Article 36 and 48
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that are sure to fail.**
There are those who believe that integration efforts need to include arrangements fo r 
equalizing the gains from  regionalization.*^ However, the gains from  regionalization to each 
member country depend on many factors, one o f which is the domestic investment 
environment and policies. Economic and political integration is a big incentive to domestic 
and foreign investors to invest in the region. Which countries investors commit their 
resources to, however, depends on such factors as the infrastructure, human labor skills, 
domestic policies, and political conditions in each country. A  country w ith a corrupt c iv il 
service and judicial system, fo r example, may not be able to  attract investment. In  fact, it  may 
lose its investors to  other member states. I t  would be inappropriate to compensate such 
countries fo r losing investors even when such a loss is coimected to integration. Such 
compensation, in this situation, would be subsidizing corruption. This does not mean that 
more developed countries in a regional group cannot o r should not assist the least developed 
ones. They can assist through such means as proportionately higher contributions to regional 
development banks or to the secretariats’ costs. Such contributions can be determined in 
terms o f GDP or GDP per capita, but they should not be tied directly to the volume or 
value o f trade. ** Regional development banks can also give prio rity  to responsible 
governments and /or nongovernmental organizations o f relatively poor countries in issuing 
loans. Essentially support programs should not be tied directly to trade nor should they be 
used to decide bureaucratically where firms should be located. Decisions on specialization 
and location o f firms should be le ft to individual investors (stakeholders). D irect interference 
w ith the trade or production decisions lim its the very benefits expected to be derived from
** See Percy S. Mistry, ‘A frica 's record o f  Regional Cooperation and Integration,’ African Affairs (2000) 
pg. 565 
Asante, 1997; pg. 67
** For detailed discussion on this see, R.E. Mshomba (2000), pg. 199
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regionalism, which are increased competition and efficiency.
In  addition to compensatory schemes, the fear o f uneven distribution o f gains o f 
integration has been an excuse fo r a second phenomenon that is selective and limited 
liberalization schemes. The fear is that member countries w ith  more advanced 
manufacturing sectors w ill benefit at the expense o f member countries w ith less advanced 
manufacturing sectors. As a result, the movement toward free trade fo r CEAO, Œ PG L, 
ECCAS, and ECOWAS, fo r example, has mainly focused on unprocessed products.*’  Tariff 
reductions on manufactured products and primary products that have undergone industrial 
processing have been held back, and they lag far behind. This selective approach, however, 
reduces the potential fo r regionalism. There is considerable homogeneity in primary 
products in the regional groups. Free trade lim ited to these products does not produce 
significant intraregional trade. Moreover, such a selective approach breeds suspicion among 
some countries that feel they are resented fo r their relative success. Some scholars believe 
that part o f the solution to the wide differences in economic development between countries 
is to assign certain industries to certain countries so that no country is le ft too far behind.^ 
This recommendation often comes packaged as part o f regional industrial development 
strategy. For example, ECCAS’s industrial policy calls fo r establishment o f large industrial 
units and an industrial development center but does not allow industrial competition among 
its member nation.^' By lim iting competition, these restrictions lim it the potential benefits o f 
integration.
*’See report by UNCTAD, 1996
™ See Rajen Harshe, ‘South A frica and trajectories o f  regional Cooperation in Southern A frica,’ Africa 
Quarterly, Vol. 39, #4, 1999 
Report by UNCTAD, 1996: 42
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Political Instability-
Even though there have been progressive political reforms in  many countries in sub- 
Saharan Africa during the last decade, wars and political insecurity has been the order o f the 
day in some parts o f the region/’ Political unrest in  the Great Lakes region, whereby the 
Democratic Republic o f Congo still has conflicts w ith Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, while 
Angola has her own troubles going on, the same is true in  Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia and Sudan. In  particular, CEPGL has been paralyzed by conflicts in the 
Great Lakes region. ECOWAS, through its peacekeeping force, the ECOMOG, has had to 
direct resources and attention to wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.^^ I t  is clear that the 
prerequisite fo r real progress in regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa is a real political 
commitment. Some countries are too overburdened w ith internal conflicts and other 
domestic challenges such as severe poverty, famine, and overwhelming debt to be diligent in 
the ir pursuit o f regionalism. Some African leaders (not unlike some leaders in other parts o f 
the World) are blinded by their own selfishness or corruption or are sim ply not able to think 
carefully about the future o f their countries.
Perhaps it  does not take the vision and commitment o f every African president for 
the integration and cooperation on the continent to thrive. A  few to ta lly committed leaders, 
including Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and Samora Michel, kept the liberation efforts 
alive fo r southern Africa in the 1970’s and 1980’s. For better or the worse, the initiative and 
operation o f the ECOWAS peacekeepir^ monitoring group (ECOMOG) have prim arily 
been the result o f Nigeria’s leadership and commitment.^’  Integration and cooperation 
initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa lack such committed leadership. Whatever leadership
’’ Percy S. Mistry, ‘A frica’s record o f  Regional integration and cooperation,' pg. 569 
R.E. Mshomba (2000), pg. 200 
”  E. Nwokedi (1992), ‘Regional integration and regional security: ECOMOG, N igeria and the Liberia 
Crisis
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emerges, it is important to ensure that integration and cooperation is used as a strategy 
towards free trade and development o f the region at large. The new leadership must be 
careful that im port substitution policies, which generally work against free trade, do not find 
the ir way into regionalism efforts. The new leadership must be careful because it  is very easy 
to argue that sub-Saharan Africa is too dependent on developed countries. In  the 1960’s and 
1970’s, sub-Saharan African countries tried to reduce this dependence by inçlem enting an 
im port substitution strategy. They did not succeed, though it was not until the 1980’s and 
1990’s that outward-looking structural adjustment programs started to replace im port 
substimtion policies at the national level.
I t  would be ironic if  the genuine efforts toward regionalism made in the spirit o f 
outward orientation would allow in ç o rt substitution policies to find new life. This would 
amount to transferring im port substitution policies from  the national to the regional level. I t  
should be noted here that im port substitution policies at the regional level are not as harmful 
as im port substitution policies at national level. This is because the regional level at least 
allows fo r increased competition and a more efficient allocation o f resources as intra­
regional trade develops.
Table In tta-R egional Trade as 
Exports o f Each Region
a Percentage o f Tota l
Region 1970 1980 1985 1993 1994
COMESA' 9.6 12.1 5.5 7.8 7.7
ECCAS 2.4 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.4
ECOWAS 3.0 10.2 5.3 10.0 10.7
SADC 2.6 p.5 1.5 7.0 8.0
Source: UNCTAD (1997a: 34-35)
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a. Data unavailable fo r Namibia and Swaziland
b. Data unavailable for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
The above table shows the offic ia l intra-regional trade as a percentage o f total 
exports o f each o f the four main regional blocs in  sub-Saharan Africa. However, given the 
widespread im officia l regional trade in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the 1980’s, the 
actual level o f intra-regional trade is h^her than what is shown in the above table.
The o ffic ia l intra-regional trade as a percentage o f total exports fo r ECCAS has been 
relatively low  and stable. The percentage fo r ECOWAS countries increased follow ing the 
establishment o f ECOWAS in 1975, from  3% in  the 1970 to  an average o f 10% in  the early 
1990’s. As fo r COMESA and SADC, it  is a little  d ifficu lt to discern the trend in their 
percentages since some o f the changes are a factor o f the changes in membership.^* Also 
hard to discern is the relationship between reducing absolute tariffs on intra-regional trade, 
on the one hand, and intra-regional trade as a percentage o f total exports o f the region, on 
the other hand. Many assume the relationship is necessarily positive. The percentage o f intra- 
regional trade may not increase, however, i f  reductions o f trade barriers are also extended to 
other countries outside the bloc. In  addition, even ta riff reductions on intra-regional trade 
alone may increase the region’s trade w ith the rest o f the world. In  either o f these cases, the 
percentage o f intra-regional trade as a percentage o f total exports o f the region is 
indeterminate a priori; that is, it may increase, stay the same or decrease.^*Suppose, fo r 
example, that Ghana exports its cotton textiles to countries outside ECOWAS. Reductions 
in trade barriers w ith in ECOWAS that enable Ghana to im port more cotton, say from  
Benin, w ill also increase Ghana’s exports o f textiles to non-ECOWAS countries. Depending
”  See R.E. M shom ba (2000), pg. 202-203
Percy Mistry, ‘A frica’s record o f  Regional Cooperation and Integration,’ African Affairs (2000), 99, 
pg.568-569
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on the value added to cotton, it  is possible fo r intra-regional trade as a percentage o f total 
exports o f the region to fall. One objective o f integration is to reduce trade costs. Since this 
is accomplished discriminately, it may lead to trade diversion from  OECD markets to 
African markets as noted in the previous chapter. Many politicians and academics in sub- 
Saharan Africa consider such trade diversion to be good because it represents (or 
symbolizes) self -reliance. A  lack o f growth in intra-regional trade as a percentage o f the 
region’s total exports may suggest the absence o f trade diversion; as such, it is often 
presented as disappointing. Considering the static impact o f integration, however, trade 
diversion may cause a net welfare loss. In  addition, the reduction o f tariffs w ithin a group 
may not only increase intra-regional trade; such a reduction may also increase trade between 
members o f the group and the rest o f the world, as already illustrated. Further, sub-Saharan 
African countries have limited potential fo r increased intra-regional trade in the short run 
owing to lim ited demand fo r each other’s exports.^ This level o f demand is largely due to 
the considerable homogeneity in  primary products in  the regional groups. The 
manufacturing sector, which has the potential o f producing differentiated products and, thus 
allowing intra-industry trade, is s till very small fo r most o f the countries in the region.
Therefore, although the low  growth in the percentages shown in the table above 
suggests a lim ited reduction in trade barriers, trade liberalization must be measured in its true 
sense, the reduction in policy-induced costs o f trading. Assessing the level o f integration in 
terms o f intra-regional trade may place undue emphasis on the short-run impact o f 
regionalism, which is likely to be minimal in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic integration is a 
step toward free trade. The objective is not to break ties w ith OECD countries but rather to 
take advantages o f the economies o f scale that may help sub-Saharan African countries
^  For detailed discussions see, F. Faezeh (1992),’Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan A frica’, in ‘New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration.’
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develop their manufacturing sectors. Eventually this may indeed result in  more intra-regional 
trade. There are those who point to the adoption o f the classical model as the reason fo r the 
poor return on the economic cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa,^* Undoubtedly, the classical 
model has its lim itation in developed countries, not to mention developing countries as 
indicated in  the first chapter. In  sub-Saharan Africa, markets are not competitive, and prices 
are not flexible as the classical model assumes. There is market failures associated w ith 
externalities. Moreover, income distribution considerations may call fo r government 
programs and regulations to adapt and complement the classical model. The classical model, 
however, is often s ing ly  a convenient villain. For exançle. A lly  Ahmad in  his book Eootcwk 
Qxperation in Africa (1994) argued that the classical integration process (outward looking 
integration) in developing countries is irrelevant because developing countries lack well 
developed manufacturing sectors. Further, A ly  contended that classical integration is like ly to 
do more harm than good to member countries because o f the disparity in economic 
development between member countries. I t  is presently d ifficu lt to associate the poor return 
on integration in sub-Saharan Africa (assuming it has been adequately documented) w ith 
anything but the lim ited degree to which integration has actually taken place. The lack o f a 
well-developed manufacturing sector does not make the classical model useless unless 
integration prevents the growth o f the manufacturing sector where it  should occur, 
considering relative costs o f production.
Regarding economic development, whatever asymmetry exists between African 
countries, the asymmetry is even greater when African countries are compared to developed 
countries. Should African countries discourage trade with developed countries? Differences 
in economic development do not necessarily make trade a zero-sum game. Although it  is
’* A. Ahmad (1994), 'Economic Cooperation in Africa.’
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important to be aware o f the shortcomings o f the classical model, it cannot be disqualified 
categorically. In  the 1960’s and 1970’s, there were policymakers in Africa who ignored 
producer price incentives to subsistence farmers, naively thinking that the classical model 
(price incentives, in this case) was irrelevant to such farmers. That premise was subsequently 
well established to be wrong. What some scholars like A ly  Ahmad called classical integration 
has not yet actually happened in most regional blocs in  sub-Saharan Africa, and when it 
happens it  w ill certainly not work like magic. Effective regionalism goes far beyond reducing 
tariffs and markets harmonization. I t  includes the development o f human capital, 
infrastructure, financial systems, effective property and antitrust laws, political stability o f the 
region and other areas that affects regionalism. A ll these require thoughtful involvement o f 
the government in the economy.”  Perhaps a major problem facing sub-Saharan Africa 
regionalism as shown in this dissertation is that most o f the government decisions are 
misguided. Consider, fo r example, the high propensity to jo in  many regional blocs and an 
excess availability o f intergovernmental organizations w ithin and between overlapping 
regional blocs. This situation turns what would have been classical integration into a sphere 
o f bureaucracy and duplication. There are no signs that the propensity fo r duplication w ill 
change soon, and this is not because countries do not know what ought to be done. 
Although there is a call from  w ithin to rationalize intergovernmental organizations, the 
political w ill and courage to do so are currently lacking right now.
However, this may change with an increase in political accountability. I f  democracy 
and the private sector continue to grow, it is likely that political system and economic 
institutions that unfold w ill generate serious and healthy political and economic environment 
that w ill lead to the growth o f regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa and leaders w ill be held
”  See Aparajita Biswas, ‘Some Reflections on the classical models o f  Regional Integration in Southern 
A frica,’ Africa Quarterly, Vol. 39, # 4 , 1999
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accountable fo r their actions, as they move towards a United States o f Africa.
A  United States o f Africa?
In  the face o f mounting competition from  global economic blocs and the threat o f 
neo-colonialism, sub-Saharan African leaders joined other A frican leaders who met fo r the 
September 1999 extraordinary summit o f the Organization o f A frican U nity in  Sirte, Libya. 
A t the summit, the leaders decided that Africa would become the world’s largest economic 
and politica l bloc, and perhaps the leader o f the next miUermium.
A  record o f 43 heads o f state answered the call o f Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi 
fo r the September 8-9/99 sessions to discuss the pace at which Africa is moving in the face 
o f much global challenges. Col. Gadhafi, follow ing the example set by great revolutionary 
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, and others, specifically called fo r the establishment 
o f a United States o f Africa, w ith its own central bank, m ilita ry and parliament. On their 
target date o f 9-9-99, the O AU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim told more than 100 
journalists and international observers that the leaders had agreed to quicken the pace o f 
unity.
‘‘As ve prepare to enter the 21“ œnüay and cogdzant c f the (ho ller^ , ne emphasize the 
irrperatxiE need and h î  sense c f urgncy to rézindle the aspiratians ( f  cur peoples fa r strong nrnty, 
solidarity and adoesicn in a lar^corrm otttycfpecph transcending cidtiiral, ideologad, ethnic and ruticnd 
Sfferences. It  is our ccndcàan dxU our aintinerital argiràzatian needs to be redtalvzedinordertoheahleto 
play a mare actke role and continue to be rdeiant to dx needs (fa c r peoples and responsiie to the demands ( f  
thepm ailingâraarstanœs". -SalimAhmedSalim, farmer QA USecretary General
A fte r the summit, the O A U  determined it  would:
•  Quicken the pace o f implementing the 1991 Abuja Treaty which established an African 
Economic Community
•  Speed up the process o f establishing all o f the institutions provided in the Treaty—an 
African Central Bank, an African Monetary Union, A frican Court o f Justice and a Pan- 
A frican Parliament
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•  Strengthen and consolidate existing regional economic communities
•  Mandate its council o f Ministers to ensure implementation o f those decisions, 
particularly to prepare the legal text necessary in light o f the existing Charter and the 
Abuja Treaty
•  Mandate O A U  Chairman and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and South 
African President Thabo Mbeki to engage African creditors w ith the goal o f securing the 
total cancellation o f Africa’s debt.
Many experts and observers support the idea o f a unified Africa. In  fact, some feel 
that the O AU  and African leaders are out o f step w ith African masses that already embrace a 
sense o f regionalism. Nevertheless, all agreed that Africa is s till a continent in crisis and thus 
the mandate o f the original O A U  charter o f fighting colonialism has not yet been achieved. 
The focus now is to bring internal stability to member states some o f whom are involved in 
endless c iv il wars and rebel attacks against their governments so that the countries can gain 
control o f their mineral and human resources to strengthen their economies. In  debating his 
point at the inception o f the O AU  Charter, M r. Nkrumah argued that an African 
‘Continental Union government’ would have a two-house legislature: an upper house o f two 
members from  each state and a lower house based on the population o f each state, w ith 
power to formulate a common foreign policy, common continental planning fo r economic 
and industrial development, a common currency, monetary zone and a central bank o f issue 
and a common defense system w ith one high command military.*®
On July 2000 in Lome Togo, the Organization o f African U nity (OAU) summit went 
ahead and approved the act establishing an African Union, which eventually replaced the
°See, C O .C  Amate (1986), ‘Inside OAU: Pan-Africanism in practice.’
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OAU, thus moving one step toward the long awaited dream o f United States o f Africa. 
However, the dream o f the United States o f Africa can only become a reality if  a new model 
o f multinational state is adopted, based on a social and democratic pact and rooted in 
Africa’s own traditions. I f  A frica is to focus on the same issues and approaches as the 
European Union w ith  its expansion such as heterogeneity o f nations, languages, religions, 
standards, localities and so on, then the main question w ill be ‘would a United States o f 
Africa work?
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CHAPTER IV
V IA B IU T Y  OF R EG IO N AU SM  A N D  U N IT Y  IN  AFRICA
In  the dawn o f a new millennium Africa has come a long way from  the post-colonial
divisive days when the ideological rivalry between the so-called Monrovia and Casablanca
groups held sway in much o f the continent on regionalism and integration in general. The
Casablanca group, which included Algeria, Egypt, Ghana and Morocco, represented radical
perspectives by leaders who wanted rapid unification o f the continent and the Monrovia
group, o f which Nigeria, Tanzania and Liberia were the key players o f moderates, who
wanted step by step stages towards regionalism in  the region. These antagonistic groups were
only dissolved by the 1963 formation o f the Organization o f African U nity (OAU) - the first
attempt to make real the vision o f a united Africa. I t  was a vision that had long been
espoused by the adherents o f Pan-africanism. The Casablanca group distrusted the Monrovia
group, considering it to be composed o f "lackeys o f imperialism". As a result, the
deliberations on the O A U  Charter, at the O AU s first summit in Cairo in 1964, fell far short
o f pan-African hopes. Tire emphasis was neither on unity as seen by Ghana's Kwame
Nkrumah nor on the formation o f a United States o f Africa. Nkrumah's idea o f forming a
continental army to liberate African territories s till under colonialism o r white m inority rule
was also debunked by the moderates. They feared that Nkrumah and his radical friends
could use the proposed united army o f Africa to oust them. The O A U  settled instead fo r a
liberation committee, which was based in D ar es Salaam, Tanzania, and which did much to
assist the liberation movements in southern Africa. For much o f its existence, though, the
62
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O A U  had, in  effect, acted as the "trade union o f the African heads-of-state," to quote 
Tanzania’s firs t President, the late Julius Nyerere, one o f the organization’s founding fathers.
The O AU, w ith its out-of-date charter, narrowly defined sovere%nty by protecting 
dictators by its so-called principle o f non-interference. It had also adopted a softly-softly 
diplomatic approach in dealing with Africa’s dictators, whereby it  let them operate and do 
whatever, even if  jeopardizing their citizen’s lives. Despite its many shortcomings the O AU  
has long made significant contributions to Africa, in addition to its pivotal role in the 
continent's de-colonization process. Two o f the O A U s former secretaries-general. D r Salim 
Ahmed Salim and D iallo Telli, w ill be remembered as the most energetic and creative 
movers, fo r nurturing the nascent organization at a very d ifficu lt political period in Africa. 
During the Cold War era, Africa was seen more as a playground fo r Cold War warriors than 
as a continent striving fo r recognition in its own right. Salim Ahmed Salim w ill be 
remembered fo r creating the Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution Mechanism and 
fo r taking stem measures against member-states w ith serious arrears. He w ill also be 
honored fo r canvassing ideas on reforming the continental body and by taking a strong line 
against m ilitary regimes in Africa. Salim has also done much o f the groundwork in the 
transformation o f the O A U  into the Africa Union, as was proposed by Libya's Muammar 
Gaddafi, and whose ratification came into effect on 25 May 2000. The Africa Union is an 
ambitious project fraught w ith all sorts o f difficulties. I t  is d ifficu lt, fo r example, to see how 
such unity w ill be achieved, given the current tensions. Ideas fo r the union include creating 
an African parliament and a court o f justice. But it is d ifficu lt to see how the Union could be 
democratic if  its constituent member-states are not. There is also the Herculean task o f 
achieving economic un ity w ith all that entails, including the creation o f a common currency
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a unified central bank and “ imaginative industrialization*’. TTie current regional economic 
blocs, including Ecowas, SADQ  COMESA and the moribund Maghreb Union, would need 
to be rationalized and turned into instruments o f inclusion rather than o f exclusion. The 
road to the A frica Union w ill not be an easy one to tread. To advance, Africa has no choice 
but to take this road. Perhaps it  is just as well that A frica has a maverick such as Gaddafi to 
push it to take such bold steps.
Is Regionalism In  Africa Viable?
There are three main views concerning regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa. The first 
is optim istic and suggests that most Sub-Saharan African countries are emerging from  crisis 
and are going through a period o f transformation in which regionalism has much to offer. 
However, economic and political instability have plagued sub-Saharan African countries fo r 
decades now. The economic difficulties are broadly manifested by the general decline or 
stagnation in  the ir average GDP growth rates (both absolute and per capita) as well as by 
sharp declines in  their export growth coupled w ith marked losses in  the region’s share of 
world trade, particularly during the 1980’s and 1990’s. *® A  second view suggests that, 
irrespective o f the economic situation and whether o r not the preconditions fo r effective 
regionalism are present, cooperation is essential fo r longer-term sustainable development. 
This conviction goes beyond SSA and is most cleariy seen in the growth o f trading blocs 
such as E U  (European Union), N A FTA (North American Free Trade Area), and 
MERCOSUR (The Common Market o f South America). In  this scenario, the argument is 
that SSA must accelerate its cooperation and integration processes if  it  wants to compete
*’ Terminology used by head o f  States in  their session describing the importance o f  creative and inventive 
industrialization
*■ See CIDA (1991), ‘Africa 21: A vision o f  Africa for the 21“ century’, Canadian D evelopm ent Agency, 
Africa and M iddle East branch.
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w ith other parts o f the world.®  ̂ The th ird, and most skeptical view, is that regionalism in 
SSA, although desirable, is unlikely to have much effect in the near future un til African 
economies are stronger. The argument is that period o f economic weakness is not the best 
time to formulate plans to promote intra-regional trade, liberalize national markets, establish 
multinational sectoral linkages, and to harmonize macroeconomic policies on a regional or 
suh-regional basis.”* Governments in these situations are under pressure to sort out their 
domestic crises before addressing regional issues.
W hy Progress in  Sub Saharan Africa Has Been Slow
According to many scholars, who agree that despite continuing commitments to 
regionalism and cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the outcome is very disappointing.”'  The 
reasons depicted from  various scholars fo r this poor record are historic, political, economic 
and institutional.
H istory The colonial heritage that le ft many African countries dependent on their 
form er metropolitan countries tends to work against viable regionalism o r cooperation. 
Commercial and political links w ith Europe, fo r example, continue to be more important 
than links w ith in Sub-Saharan Africa, and communication and transport networks oriented 
towards former colonial centers do not facilitate intra-regional trade.
Economics: Most o f the Sub-Saharan African nations have been plagued by small or 
zero growth rates, difficulties o f balance payments, lack o f complementarities between 
economies, weak industrial structures, low  productivity and heavy debt burdens. Further,
OAU (1991),T re a ty  establishing the African Econom ic Community, 3 June 1991, Abuja, Nigeria: 
Organization o f  A frican Unity.
”* See Bax Nomvete, D. (1992), Economic Cooperation in Africa (South o f  the Sahara): Progress, 
Problems and Prospects’, in: W orkshop on the Prom otion o f  Regional Cooperation and Integration in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, Florence, Italy 26-28 February 1992; European University Institute, pp. 129-146 
Barad, R (1990), ‘Summary in: The long-term perspective study o f  Sub-Saharan Africa, background 
papers’. Vol. 4: Proceedings o f  a workshop on Regional Integration and Cooperation, Washington, D C: 
W orld Bank: p. 147-160
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poor infrastructures, lack o f transport facilities and non-convertible currencies all work 
against regionalism and cooperation initiatives in the region. I t  is questionable how useful 
market integration in the region can be when the gross domestic product is roughly equal to 
Belgium o r The Netherlands, and where almost half originates from  five countries.
Politics: Regionalism is an intensely political process and, when most Sub-Saharan 
African nations are defining their national identities, it  is d ifficu lt to agree on regionalism and 
cooperation that require sovereignty in  certain areas to be handed to a regional organization. 
No matter what the rhetoric, political leaders jealously guard their sovereignty and are not 
w illing to reduce the power and authority o f the state.”* When governments and politicians 
do benefit from  regionalism, they tend to pursue it seriously otherwise they do not pursue it 
seriously. However, another problem fo r many African countries is the lack o f participation 
by the general public in discussion on regional initiatives. Instead, regionalism and 
cooperation agreements are often considered to be the private domain o f politicians and c iv il 
servants. The general population tends to see cooperation as bloated and expensive 
bureaucrats attending the meetings, rather than opportunities fo r growth and development.
Institutions: There is a long lis t o f institutional weaknesses, which can be pinpointed 
here. Too many regional groupings exist in Sub-Saharan Africa; a tendency towards top 
down model w ith many political appointees; many failures by governments to meet their 
financial obligations towards regional organizations, which depend heavily on their annual 
fees. Also, reluctance by countries to hand over power and resources to regional executives; 
poor preparations before meetings, often participation by wrong people, and litde internal 
consultation between officials and ministries on decisions taken at regional meetings; and 
lack o f fo llow  up by sectoral ministries on decisions taken at regional meetings by Heads o f
** Senghor, J.C. (1990), ‘Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in Africa: An overview ’, in: P. 
A nyang’ N yong’o (ed), ‘Regional Integration in Africa: Unfinished A genda’, Nairobi, Kenya: African 
Academy o f  Sciences, pp. 17-34
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States.”  ̂The consequences can be seen at the regional level whereby different regional 
groupings compete, and duplicate their activities often holding rounds o f increasingly 
expensive meetings in terms o f spending. Further at the national level, regional agreements 
are rarely integrated into either national o r sectoral policy plan, which makes the meetings to 
be useless on development level.
Theoretical Questions 
There are several theories that can be used to describe the recent surge towards 
regionalism and the drive to one Africa. Neo-functionalism by Haas (1958) suggests that 
problems o f increasing interdependence would lead governments to more cooperation. 
Moreover, neo-Marxist, W orld system theory and neo-Gramscian theory show a class 
analysis o f regionalism. Are the above theories applicable to the African context?
Neo-Functionalism
Neo-functionalism theory explains well what the European Union experienced from  
the coal and steel community, EEC to EU. Generally, the theory claims that, in itia l steps 
towards integration in smaller settings can trigger endogenous economic and political 
dynamics leading to further co-operation. The neo-functionalist approach is based on two 
principles: First, functional spillover occurs in  the economic sphere; because o f the
interdependence between industrial sectors, the integration o f one sector makes the 
integration o f another necessary to reap the fu ll welfare benefits o f the first integration. 
Second, this is accompanied by political spillover. Interest groups o f an integrated sector are 
expected to sh ift tlie ir focus to the new decision-making center in  order to influence the 
decisions that are im portant fo r them, and to press fo r further integration o f related sectors.
See Bax Nom vete, (1992), ‘Economic Cooperation in Africa (south o f  the Sahara)’”
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Is neo-functionalist theory applicable to African context? The answer is No, because 
the theory is based on an ahistorical understanding o f human beings as rational, utility- 
maximizing individuals. The notion o f spillover implies inevitable, teleological process o f 
further integration along an objective economic rationality, although there are strong forces 
that may oppose this process. The theory explains the integration process through an 
emphasis o f internal dynamics o f European politics. There is a need to account fo r structural 
changes such as globalization and the end o f the Cold War, which changed the picture o f the 
world politics, at large.
Neo-Marxism, W orld System Theory and Neo-Gramscian Theory: a class analysis of 
Regionalism in  Africa
There are a wide variety o f neo-Marxist theories o f regionalism, most o f which deal 
w ith imperialism in one way or another. Most variants o f the neo-Marxist theory o f 
imperialism  have focused on processes that are taking place in  developed, capitalist 
countries, and ascribe the policies o f these countries’ governments to developments 
inherently to the capitalist mode o f production. International exploitation has been analyzed 
in terms o f the siphoning o ff by external actors economic surplus produced in developing 
countries. Paul Baran (1957) stressed the appropriation o f surplus by foreign investors, who 
repatriate the profits. Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) has analyzed the structurally 
disadvantageous effect o f international trade on the developing countries as a process o f 
unequal exchange. The central argument is that the value o f commodities on the 
international market is formed in  a different way from  that on national markets, since labor, 
in  contrast to capital is relatively immobile across borders. While John Gaining (1971) has 
described imperialism as a stmctural relationship between countries from  the center and 
periphery whereby the center benefits from  resources from  the periphery. The center's
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policy is aimed at fragmenting the developing world; the center enters into separate trade 
agreements w ith different groups o f developing countries. Further the developed countries 
try  to penetrate the developing world by fo rc ir^  its ‘Euro-centric’ formula o f development 
onto the local elites and the M NCs try  to block integration initiatives among mediumrsized 
and large countries (Galtung, 1973:59, Vaitsos 1982).
Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn and Arrighi are the key representatives o f world-systems 
theory. The theory is based on the understanding that over the last few centuries, a system 
has come into being that can be categorized as a capitalist world economy. The system 
contains a single division o f labor, expanding since the 16'*' century and multiple cultural 
systems. I t  is capitalist because it  is based on production fo r the world market. I t  is an 
economy since there has never been one power center that was successful in unifying the 
capitalist world economy into a single political system is the prime explanation o f 
capitalism’s persistence; hence the regionalization o f economic activities is necessary to the 
developing countries. The culmination o f Marxist analysis o f regionalism is what has 
become known as neo-Gramscian theory. The theory is based on the assumption that 
production and the social relations deriving from  production are crucial to the building o f 
political power, the formation o f state structures, and world orders (Cox, 1987).
The modem age system has seen a restructuring o f global society under the influence 
o f economic globalization. The market appears to be bursting free from  the bonds o f 
national societies, to subject global society to its laws. The shift towards a neo-liberal, 
disciplinary world order, stressing economic deregulation, the combating o f inflation, the 
reduction o f state activities, and cuts o f government expenditure are the key features o f the 
decline o f Keynesianism in the modem era. According to this approach, regionalism is a way 
in which the autonomy o f even the most powerful states is subordinated to the interests of 
large capital and a rentier view o f monetary policy. I t  provides a regional mechanism fo r
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insertion into the global economy, and also serves as a mechanism fo r globalizing the neo- 
liberal ideology. Therefore, according to the approach, regionalism is a too l fo r achieving 
hegemony o f neo-liberal economic principles, not a single state o r organization.
Lessons from  Europe 
I f  the prospects fo r Sub-Saharan Africa and African continent in general do not 
seem very bright, what can be leamed from  experiences elsewhere in  the world? In  Europe, 
economic growth, good governance, political stability, and strong institutions have all been 
necessary fo r effective regional cooperation. However, when looking at the same factors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, these preconditions are either not present, o r are not well developed. 
Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa has neither favorable intemational nor domestic environments, 
and much work is needed to reform  domestic economic policies, which hinder regionalism, 
and to build confidence that w ill revitalize economic activities. To be more precise, local 
private sector entrepreneurs and businessmen could give an important stimulus to 
regionalism development through their demands fo r better market opportunities throughout 
the region. In  regard to good govemance, many Sub-Saharan African countries face unstable 
political environments as well as regional tensions and instability. For example, the etemal 
turm oil in the Democratic Republic o f Congo, spilled-over to many countries in the Great 
Lakes regions including Burundi, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola. The same 
situation is seen in the horn o f A frica whereby Ethiopia and Eritrea have a border conflict, 
while Somalia and Sudan have the ir own etemal turmoils. Effective implementation o f 
regionalism and regional cooperation frameworks w ill only take root in healthy and 
democratic environments where economic management is both transparent and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
accountable.”” To build this kind o f political and social security requires these countries to 
have leaders w ith vision and the w ill to implement change. Furthermore, apart from  political 
and economic prerequisites, the availability o f indigenous institutional capacity is essential. A  
strong institutional set-up at the regional and national levels is fundamental, and links 
between national and regional institutions (the interface leveQ are required to integrate 
regional agreements into national policy. While all three levels are in ^o rtan t, it is amazing 
that the literature on regionalism, integration and cooperation in general in Sub-Saharan 
Africa focuses more on the roles, functions and strengthening o f regional groupings in the 
region. Far less attention has been paid to the frameworks fo r regionalism and cooperation 
at the national and interface levels.
Two lessons can be drawn from  the European Union; first there can be no effective 
regionalism w ithout national integration and participation. The European Union experience 
shows that at national level arrangements such as inter-m inisterial coordination committees, 
o r consultation mechanism w ith the chambers o f commerce, trade unions, and other 
pressure groups are essential fo r effective participation in  regional initiatives. E fforts at the 
regional level can only be sustained if  Sub-Saharan African countries can first put their own 
states/countries in order. Second, there are no simple recipes o r models, success or failure 
hinges on the specific context and environment in which the cooperation is to operate. Care 
must be taken not to transplant o r copy models from  different circumstances and context. 
They must be adapted to local needs and realities. Some o f the approaches and mechanisms 
from  Europe that may be useful in Sub-Saharan Africa are the principle o f subsidiarity, 
targeted policies to reduce welfare disparities between regions; the role o f small countries; 
and also sub-Saharan Africa needs a gradual implementation o f regionalism at a different 
pace and speed.
”” Ibid,
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The Need fo r Action at the National Level
By the end o f the 1980's, almost none o f the targets set out by the Organization o f 
African Unity's (CALI) and Lagos plan o f Action fo r a gradual establishment o f an African 
Common Market were achieved. The Treaty o f Abuja, signed in June 1991, set 2025 as a 
new date fo r attairung a pan-African Economic Community comprising 53 nations and more 
than 600 m illion people.*’  Furthermore, at the O AU  summits held in August 1999-Libya 
and August 2000-Togo agreed to move towards the United States o f Africa, following the 
path o f the European Union, and 32 countries so far have signed a treaty to establish an 
African Parliament. The institutional implications are impressive. The politico-administrative 
machinery to be created is almost a copy o f the institutional framework o f the European 
Union w ith a Council o f Ministers, Economic and Social Committee, Court o f Justice and an 
all African Parliament.
However, the biggest challenge arose from  the Abuja treaty is to move from  talk and 
prescription to action, and to change the assumption that once goals fo r regional 
cooperation have been set, implementation w ill automatically follow . Conviction and 
recommendations must be matched by commitment to implementation. One o f the most 
cmcial and urgent questions now is how the new jo in t machinery w ill be gradually 
established. This machinery is needed to take the important decisions, and when taken, to 
implement them w ithout delay o r dilution.
The treaty provides little  operational guidance on how the declarations o f intent can 
be inçlemented, and what is required to make them effective. How can Africa bridge the 
unplementation gap and move from  words to deeds? W ithout neglecting important decisions
*’ See the East African Newspaper, 23 June 2000, ‘Setting Agendas towards African Economic 
Com m unity'
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to be taken regionally, policies and institutional requirements fo r cooperation must, first and 
foremost, be addressed at the national level.
A  national agenda fo r action could include:
Building string and sustained political commitment fo r cooperation 
Building institutional capacities to manage cooperation 
Involving economic actors and c iv il society in discussion and decisions 
Opting fo r flexible types o f cooperation arrangements 
Ensuring support fo r cooperation from  the intemational donor community
Building Political Commitment
The real starting point fo r regionalism is a political w ill to support cooperation or 
integration, despite obstacles that are faced.’  ̂The history o f regionalism  in  Africa shows that 
political considerations have often slowed the implementation o f regional decisions and this 
makes African political leaders key figures in the process, their commitment to regionalism 
and cooperation w ill be largely determined by the perceived personal and national 
advantages and disadvantages brought by regionalism to political leadership and their 
respective citizens. I f  it is not likely that these leaders w ill benefit from  regionalism and 
cooperation, attempts wiU not be seriously pursued and mutually agreed policy decisions w ill 
not be implemented.
Building institutional and managerial capabilities
As pinpointed earlier in this chapter, most analyses o f regionalism and cooperation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are based more on the functioning o f institutions at the regional level.
For in depth discussions on this see Johnson, O.E.D (1991) ‘Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing 
prospects for success’. Journal o f  M odem  African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1: pp. 1-26
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Proliferation, duplication o f functions, conflicts over mandates, and errors in contributions 
have meant that the many regional institutions in  Sub-Saharan Africa find it d ifficu lt to 
implement the tasks assigned to them. Strategies to  reinforce and rationalize the existing 
regional institutional framework have been discussed in various forums and meetings. The 
most visible initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa are those taken by pan-African organizations, 
such as the O AU  (Organization o f A frican Unit)^, ADB (African Development Bank) and 
EGA (Economic Community o f Africa) whose evaluations o f some regional organizations 
has resulted in recommendations fo r the ir restructuring, merging, o r abolition.
Further, apart from  the regional institutions, strong institutions at the national level 
are indispensable fo r inçlem enting the large and increasing diverse number o f conclusions 
and recommendations formulated in regionalism and cooperation schemes. Institutions fo r 
national development should be considered before looking into the strengthening o f regional 
organizations. Very few Sub-Saharan African countries seem to have a well-structured 
national apparatus that is able to coordinate the ir involvement in different regional 
organizations. As stipulated in an EGA paper, “ Establishing national integration structure in 
each country w ill make fo r a better coordination among member states and would facilitate 
implementation o f decisions; it  w ill, also, make fo r quicker decisions. Arguably this w ill lead 
to easier consultation and harmonization at the sub-regional level” .”
M ost o f the E U  member countries, fo r example, have very clear coordinating 
procedures that work out conçromises at the country level. The Netherlands has inter- 
m inisterial coordination on an almost permanent basis at both the Cabinet level (standing 
Cabinet Committee) and at the level o f the civil servants who are involved in European 
affairs (Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee). In  Sub-Saharan Africa, ministries fo r
”  EGA 1992, ‘M easure for strengthening coordination and harm onization o f  activities among existing 
econom ic groupings’, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; U nited Nations Economic Com mission for Africa
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regional cooperation or integration might constitute a first step in the direction o f more 
coordination; but in  rare cases where they exist, these tend to have neither real coordinating 
power nor appropriate staffing. Regionalism also requires coordinated interactions between 
the national and regional levels to bring greater convergence between national development 
policies and the objectives o f integration groupings. One important theme that underpins 
efforts to strengthen intra-African economic integration and cooperation is to strengthen the 
links between national and regional development policies.
Capacity building has been identified as one o f the critical areas fo r economic 
development and regionalism processes in Sub-Saharan Africa. The W orld Bank puts it 
b luntly this way “ More access to inform ation on other African countries, more exposure to 
them, and more education about them are vita l parts o f the process” .”  Nevertheless, human 
resource development and administrative, technical and research capabilities are indeed 
fundamental in any strategy to promote regionalism. Training o f government officials and 
technocrats charged w ith implementing regional policies, and finding ways to motivate them 
are key elements that may help to achieve the objective o f regionalism and cooperation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Exchange programs and increased contacts at the personal level also 
play a major role in  building support fo r regionalism initiatives and creating a common 
factor between the actors and stakeholders both public and private in the countries 
concerned.
Further, among the capacities required there is also information management. Here, 
there is an acute lack o f awareness o f what other African countries can o ffe r to substitute the 
products presendy being imported from  developed countries. Institutional access to and 
quick transmission o f inform ation on rules and regulations implemented in partner countries
W orld Bank (1989), ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to sustainable Growth-A long-term Perspective 
study’, W ashington, D C.: W orld Bank
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and on bureaucratic procedures, publications o f standardized statistical data and so on are 
needed to lay the groundwork fo r effective regionalism.’  ̂Finally, institutional provisions are 
needed to ensure that where Pleads o f government make a decision fo r example, member 
countries provide the necessary legal effect to the decision.
Involving a broad range o f economic actors and civil society
Im portant factor in the success o f regionalism and cooperation is the emergence o f a 
so-called integration culture. Beyond actions on policy, infrastructure, and institutions there 
is a fundamental need, to mobilize the media and educational and cultural institutions to 
promote the concept that cooperation w ithin Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to enhance the 
progress o f all African societies.’* Strong non-govemmental participation is a key factor in 
achieving the goals of regionalism. Successful regionalism and cooperation schemes in 
Europe and elsewhere have not been the work o f governments alone. They have all 
benefited from  active participation by a wide range o f groups such as trade unions, 
employers’ organizations, and private entrepreneurs and these groups ensured that 
regionalism issues remained at the top o f political and economic agendas. The degree o f 
participation by c iv il society can therefore be seen as a barometer to gauge the real effects o f 
regionalism measures.
Flexible Cooperation arrangement
Full market integration (involving a surrender o f national sovereignty) is one o f 
several possible approaches to regionalism. However, this does not seem to be the right time
Langhammer, R.J. &  U. Hiem enz (1990), ‘Regional Integration am ong developing Countries: 
Opportunities, O bstacles and options, Kieler S tudien No. 232
’* See the W orld Bank (1989), ‘Sub-Saharan A frica: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth-A long-term 
Perspective study ', W ashington, D C.: World Bank, pp. 161
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fo r this type o f integration in Sub-Saharan Africa and it may be better to aim at 
arrangements that involve shared sovereignty: Thus, rather than striving fo r strong 
independent supra-national institutions w ith considerable powers and resources, African 
countries could be less ambitious, and aim to create more flexible institutions that can be 
linked more closely to national priorities and interests. This implies arrangements that are 
less binding, more project-oriented, and involve action on certain themes or in retrain  
sectors that o ffe r some immediate benefits. Therefore, w ith these types o f pragmatic 
institutional arrangements based on realistic and well-defined objectives, the emphasis shifts 
towards policy coordination rather than integration and countries can keep their autonomy, 
while at the same time; cooperate in areas where they perceive a need to do so.”  Experience 
shows that the chances o f success are higher where loss o f sovereignty is low  and potential 
benefits are high. Concentrating efforts on more modest activities in which the benefits to all 
participants are clear and appropriable was the kind o f strategy followed by the European 
Union when it  began as a series o f cooperation agreements on iron and steel.
Ensuring D onor Support
The prim ary responsibility fo r effective regionalism and cooperation lies w ith the 
governments and populations o f the countries concerned. However, given the magnitude o f 
the problems and the very lim ited resources o f the most African specifically Sub-Saharan 
African countries, substantial international support is needed to supplement national 
efforts.”  External financial and technical cooperation can play a catalytic role, but only if
See Ravenhill, J. (1990), ‘Overcoming Constraints to Regional Cooperation in Africa: Coordination 
rather than Integration?’ in: The long-term Perspective study o f  Sub-Saharan Africa, Background Papers 
Vol. 4: Proceedings o f  a workshop on Regional Integration and Cooperation, W ashington, D C.: World 
Bank, pp. 81-85
”  See Mutharika, B. (1990), ‘The role o f  donor agencies in promoting regional integration: A search for 
new directions and perspectives’, in: The long-term perspective study o f  Sub-Saharan Africa, background
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they are derived from  the priorities o f the A frican countries and try  not to formulate 
‘solutions’ from  outside. Care is needed to ensure that regionalism in the same way as 
governance does not become another donor-imposed condition, o r that international donors 
display a greater enthusiasm fo r regionalism than A frican countries themselves.
Problems and Prospects fo r African Unity-U nited States o f Africa 
African countries finished a historic event o f transforming the moribund 
Organization o f African U nity (OAU) to the A frican Union (AU) on July o f 2001. This 
historic e ffort requires leadership, courage and willingness to depart from  the ways o f the 
past, i f  it  is to do fo r Africa what the European Union has done fo r Europe. The African 
Union, inspired by the European Union and styled on other global continental bodies in 
Asia and America, is being touted as a continental body that w ill pave the way to  a better life 
fo r all Africans. However, too much faith is being placed in  a document that establishes the 
African Union, which looks good on paper but m ight be hard to implement. African leaders 
are rushing to create what should be a more effective politica l and economic union without 
enough thought, only fo r fear o f being left trailing behind in  the rapid race o f globalization.”  
Further, the timetable put forward fo r trying to achieve the union goals is very unrealistic 
and could backfire. The African Union idea is good, but the continental economy is too 
sim ilar to have an impact like that o f Europe. Some o f A frica ’s renowned political analysts, 
such as A li Mazrui and Mwesiga Baregu have warned that the A U  runs the danger o f 
creating structures w ithout meaningful content if  it emulates the European Union. The A U  
structured to have a pan-African parliament, continental court, central bank and monetary
paper, vol. 4: Proceedings o f  a workshop on Regional Integration and Cooperation; W ashington. D C.: 
W orld Bank, pp. 130-134
”  James Muhammad, 'A frican Leaders: “Let us Unite” : OAU sum m it ends in Agreement to speed pace 
toward One A fnca’, www.finalcall.com (09/21/1999)
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fund as basic institutions, which looks good on paper but practically very complicated taking 
into considerations A frica’s disjointed cultures and colonial bacl^round.
Does the current Continental Leadership have what it  takes? The answer to the 
above question is Yes and No. There are current serving African leaders w ith vision and 
integrity, who are competent and committed. On the other hand, there are those who have 
not lived up to high hopes and expectations o f the ir election o r self-selection through coup 
and have manifestly failed their people. There are hawks and doves, there are movers and 
shakers and there are those leaders who delight in obstructing and thwarting progress. In  
short, Africa has some leaders who are a credit to the continent and those who are a 
disgrace. The United Nations Secretary General, M r. K o ffi Atman, speaking at the African 
summit in Lusaka, Zambia stressed that the resolution o f many conflicts in Africa was 
essential to making the continent framework Additionally, he pointed out that the conflicts 
in the continent were in a great measure the result o f misguided leadership, which is 
unwilling or unable to put the people’s interests first.’ * The OAU, which was created in 1963 
dismally failed to resolve conflicts on the war tom  African continent” . Africa has had an 
unfair share o f dictators and m ilitary autocrats compared to other continents on earth. In  
1966, only three years after the form ation o f the O AU, Kamuzu Banda declared himself the 
President fo r life and simultaneously made Malawi a one-party state. In  1972, Nguema, 
President o f Equatorial Guinea after independence, also declared himself president fo r life. 
Recently Frederick Chiluba o f Zambia tried to make himself an etemal president but the idea 
was shrugged o ff by members o f his own party while in Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe has 
vowed that the opposition movement fo r democratic change w ill “ never, ever” rule his
’* Norimitsu Onishi, ‘A frican Bloc to do better as the “African Union”, New York Times, July 12, 2001 
”  See T. Ademola Oyejide &  M ufutau L. Raheem, ‘Long-term  Developm ent in  Sub-Saharan Africa: 
W ould Regional Integration H elp?’ in: G iovanni Andrea Comia & Gerald K. Helleiner (Eds.), From 
A djustm ent to Developm ent in Africa (St. M artin ’s Press, 1994)
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country. Moreover, illegitimate governments have also ‘graced’ the continent through 
various coup dé tats and Nigeria has fe lt the greatest pinch o f this m ilita ry despotism under 
various m ilitary autocrats Ib rahim Babangida and Sani Abacha deserves a special mention 
here. In  war tom  Somalia, the m ilitary junta under the leadership o f Siad Barre even went to 
the weird extreme o f declaring war on his people by bombing them, all happening in  an 
open view o f OAU, which did absolutely nothing, just like it  turned a blind eye to the 
Matebeleland massacres in  Zimbabwe’s present government in  1980’s. Therefore, w ill the 
African Union succeed where the O A U  monumentally failed?
The worst area o f failure by the O A U  has been in  conflict resolution. Africa 
particularly south o f Sahara has been literally tom  apart by a barrage o f c iv il wars and a 
myriad o f border conflicts yet the O A U  remained quiet on these unfortunate 
‘developments’. For example, from  ongoir^ Angolan war, the war in Guinea Bissau, the 
Mozambican conflict, the Somali crisis and the Democratic Republic o f Congo etemal 
struggles, are few  ̂conflicts, which can be mentioned as a failure o f OAU. In  short Africa has 
become a boiling pot o f c iv il strife where governments raid state coffers to buy more 
ammumtion and guns than medicine and books.*°° Although, article three o f the 1963 O A U  
charter advocates the respect fo r national sovere%nty and territoria l integrity by its members, 
border conflicts have been rampant on the continent and Ethiopia, which hosted the 
headquarters o f the O A U  and is now the A frican Union head office, is entangled in 
abnormally long and yet unresolved border disputes and conflicts w ith its neighbors Somalia 
and Eritrea. The O A U  conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution organ o f 1993 
proved, beyond any reasonable doubt that it was not an effective organ. Most o f the 
continent’s far-reaching conflicts actually occurred after 1993. A  classic example o f O A U
For further discussion on this see Carol B. Thompson, ‘ Regional Challenges to globalization: 
Perspectives from  Southern A frica’, N ew  Political Econom y, Abingdon; M arch 2000
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failure in  resolving conflicts afflicting Africa is the long internal conflict in  the Democratic 
Republic o f Congo form erly Zaire, whereby some o f it ’s neighboring countries tried to get 
involve in  one way o r the other fruitlessly.
Concluding Remarks: Is African U n ity  a W ishful Thinking?
The treaty establishing the African Union was signed in  July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia 
cherishing the great dream from  the earliest days o f pan-Africanism. For many political 
leaders, the failure o f the post-colonial state is the root cause o f the marginalization and 
upsurge in  violence that affects a b ^  portion o f A frican continent and set it into chaos. They 
also th ink the failure is the source o f the dramatic rise in  poverty that now threatens the 
survival o f tens o f thousands o f people. I t  is destroying what remains o f social cohesion, and 
leaving the way open to the terrifying pandemics o f Aids and Malaria. Further, fo r Africa 
(Sub-Saharan Africa in particular), it is absolutely prerequisite to emerge from  this crisis and 
it is the only chance o f meeting the challenges o f g lo b a liz a tio n .In  doing so, Africa should 
come up w ith  a new state model based on African traditions. Unless new life is ejected into 
it, the concept o f African Union w ill rem ain an em pty shell. A frica w ill not have genuine 
constitutional states or sustainable development let alone the intellectual revival and resolve 
it so desperately needs.'" The failure o f the post-colonial state reflects a questioning o f the 
w ill to co-exist, and loss o f purpose and direction. The nations (or ethnic groups) are in 
fundamental disagreement about the co m m unity’s basic values. H ow  are we to define a free 
society, authority that is properly conferred and shared, and law that seem to come naturally? 
State and society seem to have been in conflict ever since A frica’s multi-ethnic societies saw 
their own model destroyed to make way fo r an enforced western caricature or model.
Ibid.
102 Tim othy M. Shaw, 'N ew  Regionalisms in Africa in the new  millennium: Comparative perspectives on 
renaissance, realism s and/or regressions’. New Political Econom y, Abington; November 2000
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Although colonial domination disrupted the process o f state building, African societies 
remain m ulti-ethnic by nature."*^ The pre-colonial nations that marked out identities o f these 
m ultiiu tiona l states survived even though they were parceled out and often dispersed among 
several states, it was not impossible to re-forge a societal lin k  A n  unexpected consequence 
o f the crisis in the nation-state is that the concept o f nation is no longer shackled by the laŵ  
o r by revolutionary mystique."^ The break-up o f the Soviet Union and form er Yugoslavia, 
the separation between Czech Republic and Slovakia and between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the 
Tutsi genocide and the chaos in Somalia are all proof o f that. Reinstating these tribal nations 
w ill make it  possible to bring to an end the crisis o f national consciousness and identity that 
is ravaging Africa, and w ill prevent political manipulation o f disputes over nationality.'”* The 
kind o f mampulation that led, fo r example, to the banishment o f the Banyamulenge 
community to the east o f Congo-Kinshasa, and the marginalization o f the form er President 
Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia or form er Prime M inister Alassane Ouattara in Ivo ry  Coast. 
This renaissance o f the state can be rooted in  African-ness. Contrary to received wisdom, 
black Africa, like Europe, created its own model o f m ultinational state and nation-ethnic 
groups such as the empnes o f Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Songhay, Noupe, Benin, the Congo, 
Mwanamutapa and Zimbabwe date back to the African Middle Ages. In  those societies, the 
political element came before the state, although it  is traditionally assumed to have 
developed w ith the advent o f the nation-state. In  contrast to the nation-state w ith its 
m onopoly on legislation, the multi-ethnic character o f A frican societies led them to  establish 
two legislative areas w ithin the constitution o f the m ultinational state.'°* The state is 
responsible fo r general legislation and the national or eth n ic area fo r specific legislation on
M anila Tshiyem be, ‘inventing the Multination: W ould United States o f  A frica w ork?’ Le M onde 
Diplom atique, Septem ber 2000 
Ibid,
Ibid,
M wayila Tshiyembe, ‘Inventing the M ultination: W ould a United States o f  A frica W ork?’
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land-ownership, inheritance, registration o f births and deaths and so on. An indhtdual basks 
in  genuine pluralism  o f law, dependii^ on the area o f law that is relevant, as well as the kind 
o f activity he pursues in  it and the status he claims.
However, to achieve the benefits o f African Union to all, African law must be 
rescued from  the non-law o r “ customary”  law to which it  has been relegated because 
colonialism made it  mimic to other systems, and pluralism o f law must be restored. 
Therefore the African charter on Human rights tried to reflect this special feature by 
including in its title  the concept o f ‘peoples’ rights, but even failed to  define the substance o f 
those rights. T te  post-colonial state has thus retained absolute sovere^nty, and peoples have 
been deprived o f their own means of subsistence, fo r instance, the Ogoni people o f the 
N iger Delta, N igeria’s o il producing region, o r the Dioula people o f Casamance who are 
rebelling against the Senegalese state. Furthermore, in this model o f m ultinational state, the 
rights o f m inorities carmot be enforced against the rights o f the majority. The state and the 
nations that make it  up would have to respect the principles o f equality and the right to be 
different, in  order to  achieve a common destiny.
Benefits o f Integral Federalism
Nevertheless, I  can say that, integral federalism should emerge and in it  power is 
allocated based on a threefold federation o f nations, citizens and localities. I t  operates on the 
premise that the state acts on behalf of several nations, scattered over a number o f localities. 
In  that sense, authority and political action can be exercised rationally and effectively only if  
power is accorded firs t by reference to nations and citizens, and only then by territory. In  
fact, the tribal districts, communes and autonomous provinces are po litica lly significant only 
because they are the cradles o f the nations and where rinVfns concerned the founders of the 
political system.
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A  major new feature o f integral federalism is the transformation o f these sub-ethnic 
groups into jo in tly  managed political areas that channel a m ix o f people towards a shared 
destiny, so avoiding any form  o f ethnic cleansing. The territoria l federalism o f the nation­
state relies on the fundamental principle that since the nation is a single, indivisible entity, 
effective exercise o f political authority depends on it  being applied to the whole o f the 
te rrito ry over, which the population is dispersed. However, integral federalism requires that 
power be structured according to the political division o f the territory: into counties, 
townships, regions, federate state and so forth. In  this way, African Union can achieve the 
goals put fo rth  by its founding fathers o f the great pan-Africanism, and may be the long 
worked efforts on regionalism in  Africa w ill be rewardir^ to the continent, which s till lags 
behind in many human development factors and economically in  general.
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